University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law
Faculty Scholarship

Francis King Carey School of Law Faculty

1996

Innovations in Collective Bargaining: Nummi - Driven to Excellence
Marley S. Weiss
University of Maryland School of Law, mweiss@law.umaryland.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Digital Commons Citation
Weiss, Marley S., "Innovations in Collective Bargaining: Nummi - Driven to Excellence" (1996). Faculty
Scholarship. 608.
https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac_pubs/608

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Francis King Carey School of Law Faculty at
DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

INNOVATIONS IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:
NUM1vii- DRIVEN TO EXCELLENCE
Marley S. Weiss*

I.

INTRODUCTION

NUMMI, New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc., has surely
accomplished one of the most remarkable transformations in the annals
of U.S. manufacturing. 1 In 1982, General Motors Corp. ("GM") closed
its twenty year old automobile production plant in Fremont, California.
This plant was renowned for the militancy of its unionized workforce,
represented by Local 1364 of the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
("UAW''). The Fremont operations were characterized by extreme
hostility between labor and management, low productivity levels, and

* Associate Professor, University of Maryland School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School,
1974; B.A., Barnard College, 1971.
1. For factual material, this article relies heavily upon the presentations of Martha Quesada,
NUMMI employee and active, rank and file member ofUAW Local2244, and its predecessor when
General Motors operated the plant, UAW Local 1364; Elisa Martinez, NUMMI labor relations
representative; and Jim Burch, NUMMI Manager for Government Affairs, and former Manager,
Human Resources, at the Canada-Mexico-U.S. Workshops on Labor Law and Practice, Workshop
No. 3, "Innovations in Collective Bargaining," June 29, 1994, La Jolla, California, U.S.A.
(unpaginated transcript on file with the United States Department of Labor, Office of the American
Workplace) [hereinafter respectively Quesada Presentation, Martinez Presentation, and Burch
Presentation]. It also draws extensively upon the text of the AGREEMENT BETWEEN NEW UNITED
MOTOR MANUFACTURlNG, INc. AND UAW (July 1, 1991) (a copy of this agreement is on file with
the author) [hereinafter NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT]. This contract was in effect for the period of
July I, 1991 through July 31, 1994. A new agreement was ratified on August 10, 1994. See
NUMMI Workers Approve New Four Year Contract, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 156, at All (Aug.
16, 1994). References in this paper are to the 1991-1994 agreement in effect at the time of the trinational, LaJolla workshop.
Ms. Martinez' presentation was largely based upon the NUMMI 1993 Speaker's Bureau
Slideshow Script (unpublished document, copy on file with the author) [hereinafter NUMMI Script].
In addition, the author conducted lengthy preparatory interviews in LaJolla with both Ms. Martinez
and Ms. Quesada on June 29, 1994. Where information is derived from the author's notes of those
interviews, rather than the formal workshop presentations, it is so indicated.
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high defect rates in their products?
In 1983, Toyota and GM formed a joint venture, NUMMI, to
produce Toyota-designed small cars, under Toyota management, at the
shuttered plant. Using a workforce composed primarily of former GM
Fremont plant employees, by 1986, NUMMI was matching the productivity and quality standards set in Toyota's Japanese plants.3 Absenteeism
has remained a consistently low three percent.4 NUMMI is now the
only automobile manufacturing plant remaining in operation in California.5
NUMMI succeeded despite the absence of certain factors often
considered to be advantageous to other Japanese automobile industry
transplant facilities. The plant was not originally designed to function
with Japanese production methods; the workforce was not handpicked for
its adaptability to team manufacturing and company goals; and the
NUMMI workforce is not predominantly composed of young workers,
untainted by prior exposure to traditional U.S. manufacturing systems,
and lacking strong commitment to unionization.
On the contrary, NUMMI started with a workforce typical of older,
existing Big Three automobile manufacturing plants. Some eighty-five
percent of initial hires were prior GM Fremont plant workers. Most were
UAW members. Many were over age forty, with attendant higher
pension and. insurance benefit costs.6 The workforce was at least as
diverse on the basis of race and sex as a typical GM plant,7 and
considerably more so than most of the new, Japanese automobile
transplant facilities. 8 Moreover, NUMMI recognized and bargained

2. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1; NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 1; Paul S. Adler,
Time-and-Motion Regained, HARV. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 97, 97-98; Lowell Turner,
Industrial Relations and the Reorganization of Work in West Germany: Lessons for the U.S., in
UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 217,232 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds,, 1992).
3. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 2, at 99; Turner, supra note 2, at 233-34, 246 nn.30-31; Ray
Marshall, Work Organization, Unions and Economic Performance, in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC
COMPETITIVENESS 287, 303 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds., 1992). Productivity at the
plant is 50% higher than it was under GM control, and 40% higher than the average in traditional
GM plants. !d. NUMMI "doubled productivity in a nine month period." Donna Brown, Why
Participqtive Management Won't Work Here, 81 MGMT. REv. 42 (June 1992).
4. PaulS. Adler & Robert E. Cole, Designed for Learning: A Tale of Two Auto Plants, 34
SLOAN MGMT. REv. 85, 87 (Spring 1993).
5. Gary S. Vasilash, NUMMI: Proving that Cars Can Be Built in California, 104 PRODUCTION
36, 37 (Feb. 1992).
6. Adler, supra note 2, at 99; see also Turner, supra note 2, at 233, 246 n.30 (setting the
figure at 80% rather than 85%).
7. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1.
8. Adler, supra note 2, at 99.
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collectively with the UAW from its inception; this plant has never been
a non-union operation.9
None of the usual American excuses for weak production apply,
when confronted with the success of the NUMMI management system
at the Fremont plant. The combination of lean manufacturing methods,
familial organizational philosophy, worker participation, and cooperative
labor-management relations has consistently yielded award-winning
vehicles, and has become a model for American industry. In 1994, for
example, the Geo Prizm that the plant builds for Chevrolet was rated by
J.D. Power & Associates as the fourth best built car in the industry, only
following behind three Lexus models. 10
Nevertheless, creating and maintaining a mutually acceptable,
cooperative labor-management environment has entailed sustained efforts
on all sides. The plant's future, while bright, is not entirely secure.
This article will examine the NUMMI system in greater detail,
focusing particularly upon the organization of work and the workforce,
key aspects oflabor-management relations, and the role played by worker
participation. It will then situate the NUMMI approach in the context of
other models of lean manufacturing and worker participation. Finally,
it will address legal questions pertaining to the NUMMI model of
collective bargaining and union representation, and will consider the need
for labor law reform in the U.S. if such a model is to be encouraged.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

GM opened the Fremont, California assembly plant in 1962,
eventually employing about 7,000 UAW members to build about 300,000
cars and trucks per year. By 1982, when it closed the plant, bargaining
unit employment had fallen to about 5,000, absenteeism was running
about twenty percent, and labor-management relations at the plant were
plagued by wildcat strikes, low productivity, and other blatant manifesta-

9. Marshall, supra note 3, at 302. This is particularly unusual since Japanese-owned factories
in the United States are largely non-union. See Japanese-owned Companies in United States Tend
To Mimic Non-union U.S. Firms, Study Finds, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at A-5 (Feb. 27,
1992). While several other Japanese joint ventures with Big Three automakers have followed
NUMMI's lead and recognized the American or Canadian Auto Workers union when they have
taken over existing plant facilities, no Japanese automobile manufacturer has yet permitted
unionization at any greenfield site. See Ernest J. Yanarella & William C. Green, The UAW and
CAW Confront Lean Production at Saturn, CAM/, and the Japanese Automobile Transplants, 18
LAB. STUD. J. 52, 57, 60 nn23-24, 70-72 (Jan. 1994).
10. Martinez Presentation, supra note 1.
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tions of mutual hostility. 11 Hundreds of grievances remained unresolved
at the time of the closing. 12 GM was, however, in the process of
recentralizing its production in the midwestern United States, and closing
many plants to reduce overall production capacity. 13 The closure
decision, therefore, cannot be blamed squarely on adversarial labor·
management relations.
In late 1982, GM and Toyota entered into negotiations, and in 1983,
reached an agreement in principle to establish the joint venture subse·
quently named NU1v1MI. The joint venture was to be an independent
company, using production concepts and techniques similar to those
employed by Toyota in its Japanese facilities. GM wanted to obtain
direct experience with the highly-acclaimed Toyota production system,
as well as a high quality subcompact automobile to be sold under its
Chevrolet label. Toyota wanted to explore the feasibility of using its
Japanese produ.ction methods with American workers and suppliers. 14
The Japanese automaker also hoped to reduce the protectionist political
pressures generated by large volume imports of Japanese-made automobiles.15
Initially, Toyota sought to operate the plant on a non-union basis. 16
However, as a result of pressure placed upon GM from the UAW,
Toyota was ultimately persuaded to enter into a letter of intent with the
union. 17
Toyota agreed to fill a majority of the initial employee complement
from among the 5,000 laid-off GM Fremont employees, to recognize
their union, the UAW, as the collective bargaining agent for the plant,
and to pay prevailing U.S. auto industry wages and benefits. In return,

11. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1; Adler, supra note 2, at 98. Adler claims employment
had fallen to 3,000 at closure. Adler, supra note 2, at 98. Quesada, who then was working in the
plant as a GM employee, estimated that about 5,000 employees remained on the active payroll
shortly before closure. Approximately the same number of employees retained layoff status when
the plant closed, ensuring that if the plant were to reopen under GM auspices, they would be entitled
to recall to employment in order of seniority. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1.
12. Adler, supra note 2, at 99.
13. See, e.g., Maryann Keller, Labor Unrest at GM, 175 AUTOMOTIVE INDUS. 13 (May 1995).
14. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 1-2; Joseph L. Badaracco, Jr., Alliances Speed Knowledge
Transfor, 19 PLAN. REv. 10, 12 (1991).
15. See Badaracco, supra note 14, at 12; Martin Kenney & Richard Florida, How Japanese
Industry Is Rebuilding the Rust Belt, 94 TECH. REV. 24, 27 (Feb. 1991); Edward K. Miller & Drew
Winter, The "Other Big 3" Are Becoming All-American, 27 WARDS AUTO WORLD 24, 37 (Feb.
1991).
16. Adler, supra note 2, at 98; Lindsay Chappell, Labor Rules Are Models for Partners,
Transplants, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Oct. 19, 1992, at 39.
17. Adler, supra note 2, at 98-99.
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the UAW agreed to accept the Toyota production system, based upon
team concepts and broad job classifications. 18 In addition, the union
agreed to "a non-adversarial relationship built on mutual trust, respect,
and cooperation." The company and union operated under this letter of
understanding for twenty-two months, before entering into a formal
collective bargaining agreement. 19
After several months of factory renovation, NU.T\IfMI commenced
hiring workers and reopened the Fremont facility in 1984.20 NUMiv1I
sent application forms to al15,000 laid offFremont plant bargaining unit
employees. The application materials advised the employees that
NUMMI would not be bound by the collective bargaining agreement
formerly in effect between GM and the UAW at the Fremont facility.
The materials also informed prospective applicants that unlike its
predecessor employer, NUMivii would not tolerate such poor employment practices as high absenteeism and low quality. The company
received back about 3,000 completed applications from the former GM
employees.21 After screening out those it evaluated as unacceptable,
NUMiv1I hired a majority of the remaining applicants.22
Originally, the plant exclusively made subcompact cars for GM and
Toyota. However, in 1991, the facility was expanded to add a compact
truck line for Toyota.23
As of this writing, NUMivii employs about 4,300 workers, including
3,500 bargaining unit employees, working on two shifts, and is in the
process of further expansion. The plant presently makes the Geo Prizm
for Chevrolet and the Toyota Corolla Sedan and Toyota compact pickup
trucks for Toyota. It has the capacity to manufacture about 220,000 cars
and 125,000 trucks per year.24 This compares quite favorably with
GM's previous production of some 300,000 vehicles per year using 6,000

18. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 3; Adler, supra note 2, at 99.
19. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 3.
20. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 3-4; Adler, supra note 2, at 99.
21. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 4.
22. See Turner, supra note 2, at 246 n.30 (stating that of the 3,300 applications received,
NUMMI hired approximately 2,000 out of an initial workforce of 2,500); see also Adler, supra note
2, at 99 (stating that about 85% of approximately 2,200 initially hired hourly employees at NUMMI
were former GM Fremont plant workers). Despite the screening, "in the end, most workers from
the old plant who wanted jobs at NUMMI were hired, including former union activists." Turner,
supra note 2, at 233; accord Quesada Presentation, supra note 1.
23. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 10-11; see also Thomas F. Black, Things "Pick Up" at
NUMM/, 21 WARD'S AUTO WORLD 41 (Feb. 1991); Vasilash, supra note·s, at 37.
24. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 10-11.
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employees.25
NUMMI has a separate corporate identity, with a Board of Directors
composed of equal numbers of GM and Toyota representatives. GM is
charged with marketing and financial responsibility. Toyota is responsible for the day to day management of the enterprise.26
At its inception, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") was
reluctant to approve the joint venture because of the size and market
share of the two participants.27 It did so, nevertheless, but restricted the
life of the joint venture to twelve years, and imposed further restraints
upon the sharing of information between GM and Toyota.28 In 1993,
however, GM and Toyota successfully petitioned the FTC to eliminate
the time limit, on grounds of the vast competitive changes within the
automobile industry.29 NUMMI is now free to continue operations as
long as its two corporate parents so desire.
Prior to the decision to continue operations in the joint venture
format, it was widely speculated, among workers in the plant as well as
among outsiders, that Toyota would buy the facility from GM. 30 GM,
after all, has been reducing an enormous amount of excess capacity,
while Toyota has been trying to expand its limited, fully-exhausted
production capacity in North America.31
One important factor cited by Toyota management in deciding to
retain the joint venture format was the fear of more adversarial labormanagement relations. While at present, it enjoys excellent relations
with both the UAW local union and the international union, Toyota
recognizes that the UAW is a democratic organization. Toyota has
repeatedly expressed concern that at some future point, more militant

25. See Quesada Presentation, supra note 1.
26. Martinez Presentation, supra note 1; Vasilash, supra note 5, at 38.
27. Martinez Presentation, supra note 1; Lindsay Chappell, It's NUMMI Forever, or NUMMI
No More; Plant's Fate Awaits FTC Decision, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, July 5, 1993, at 16. Chrysler
Corp. and Ford Motor Corp., fearing the competition, strongly objected to the joint venture which
was originally scheduled to cease in December, 1996. /d.
28. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 2; Chappell, supra note 27, at 16; Vasilash, supra note
5, at 38.
29. Martinez Presentation, supra note 1; Lindsay Chappell, Toyota Seeks NUMMI Boost; Wants
To Double Output, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Nov. 8, 1993, at 1.
30. See, e.g., Chappell, supra note 27, at 16; Black, supra note 23, at 41; Vasilash, supra note
, 5, at 38. Vasilash notes that "according to a consensus of several industry observers, ••• the plant
going to Toyota seems to be the [possibility] to bet on." Vasilash, supra note 5, at 38. But see
Profitability Is Now Toyota's Main Focus, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Nov. 30, 1992, at 26 (quoting
President Tatsuro Toyoda of Toyota Motor Corp., previously the founding president ofNUMMI, as
saying that the NUMMI joint venture partnership "should continue, as is.").
31. See, e.g., Chappell, supra note 27, at 16.
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leadership might ascend to power within the union and pursue a less
cooperative course.32
Nevertheless, Toyota has made several decisions to expand plant
capacity and production operations, and is in the process of another
expansion of truck production. However, as a condition of committing
capital to expansion, NUM:MI extracted from the union a major
concession on workers' schedules, which the union rank and file plainly
would not have accepted otherwise.33 The limit, then, for the union and
the workers, of the relationship of trust and cooperation, is the
employer's implicit threat of withdrawal of capital or refusal to commit
further investment.34
For the first several years after the plant opened, the elected local
union administration was highly supportive of the NUM:MI lean
production process, worker participation, and cooperative labor-management relations. 35 However, there have been a series of elections in
which representatives of an opposition faction, the People's Caucus, has
won seats on the bargaining committee, which negotiates and administers
the collective bargaining agreement. Insurgent candidates have also won
elected office within the administrative governance structure of the local

32. Cf. Turner, supra note 2, at 235 (stating that NUMMI's "management clearly aimed for and
would be more comfortable with a tamer enterprise union.''); see also Turner, supra note 2, at 240
(discussing the notion that one path to successful work reorganization into the lean production
system is through ''the integration of subordinate local unions into managerial processes.''). Turner
added that "[t]he Japanese model, which poses current dangers for unions in the U.S., is probably
the model that NUMMI management had in mind until union politics intervened.'' Turner, supra
note 2, at 240. The dissident wing of the UAW, New Directions, has opposed the trend towards
labor-management cooperation and urges the UAW to return to a more adversarial stance. See, e.g.,
Robert R. Rehder, Japanese Transplants After the Honeymoon, 33 Bus. HORIZONS 87, 88 (Jan.
1990); Bob Filipczak, Unions in the '90s: Cooperation or Capitulation?, 30 TRAINING 25,25-26,
30 (May 1993). The anti-lean production/team-based participation view is most fully articulated in
MIKE PARKER & JANE SLAUGHTER, CHOOSING SIDES: UNIONS AND THE TEAM CONCEPT {1988).
33. Interview with Martha Quesada, NUMMI employee and UAW Local 2244 activist, in
LaJolla, Cal. (June 29, 1994). The 1994 expansion is only the most recent in which NUMMI has
extracted a quid pro quo. NUMMI has displayed a pattern of demanding union concessions on work
schedules and break times as a condition of new investment and expansion of production at the
Fremont facility. Management attempted to extract concessions from the union regarding break-time
as a condition of its 1991 expansion, adding compact truck production. See Black, supra note 23,
at 41. In 1993, expansion plans were canceled when Local 2244 membership refused to ratify a
contract amendment permitting a three crew, 10 hour per day work schedule for certain operations.
Lindsay Chappell, NUMMI Cancels Expansion, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, June 28, 1993, at 1. When the
members reversed themselves in a second ratification vote, expansion plans were reinstated. Lindsay
Chappell, NUMMI Revives Expansion, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, July 12, 1993, at 1; UAW Agrees to
Contract Modifications at NUMMI, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 131, at diS (July 12, 1993).
34. See Quesada Presentation, supra note l.
35. Interview with Martha Quesada, supra note 33.
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union. The opposition faction seeks a return to more traditional,
adversarial representation, particularly on the shop floor. So far,
however, political control of both the bargaining committee and the local
union executive board has remained in the hands of leaders favoring
continuation of the NUMMI-style cooperation and participation
processes.36
At the international union level, for the past ten or fifteen years,
there has been consistent, high level support for innovative, cooperative
approaches to labor-management relations and worker participation.
Nevertheless, the UAW has been deeply divided about how far and how
fast to proceed in this direction.37 Now that Owen Beiber has retired
and Stephen T. Yokich has assumed the office of president of the
international union, it is probable that the UAW will take a stronger
position against what some would regard as erosion of the traditional
union arms-length relationship with the employer. The international
union may well view experimental, cooperative relations more cautiously.38 NUMMI's concerns about a change in union direction are not

36. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1; Interview with Martha Quesada, supra note 33; Turner,
supra note 2, at 234-35; see also GM, Toyota Joint Venture Provides Model ofLabor-Management
Cooperation, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 233, at d20 (Dec. 7, 1993) [hereinafter Joint
Venture]. Local union president Charles Curry, elected on the People's Caucus slate in 1991,
switched one year later to the Administration Caucus.
37. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1; Interview with Martha Quesada, supra note 33. See
generally Harry Katz & John Paul MacDuffie, Collective Bargaining in the U.S. Auto Assembly
Sector, in CONTEMPORARY COLLECllVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 181, 210-11, 213
(Paula B. Voos ed., 1994).
38. The mixed reactions to, and even withdrawal from some key aspects of the UAW's most
extensive experiment in labor-management cooperation and worker participation, with OM's Saturn
subsidiary, is illustrative. Shift-Rotation Vote Scheduled at General Motors Saturn Plant, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 167, at dl1 (Aug. 31, 1994); see Saturn Workers Vote to Reconsider Nontraditional, Rotating Work Schedule, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 173, at d9 (Sept. 9, 1994). The local union
president, Mike Bennett, has complained that then international vice president responsible for Saturn
and GM operations, Stephen P. Yokich, is "too slow to relinquish traditional union concepts like
seniority." /d. Yokich has intervened at Saturn in response to member complaints that the rotating
shift schedule, favored by Bennett, disrnpts family relationships and poses health hazards to
employees. Yokich has also pressured both Saturn and the local leadership to permit Saturn
employees to write traditional formal grievances over routine shop floor disputes, in response to
persistent member complaints of serious shop floor problems. See UAW Leaders Agree Saturn Must
Expand, Despite Problems with Current Contract, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at d11 (Jan. 13,
1994). The rotating schedule has deeply divided the local's membership, producing a series of
contradictory membership votes. See Saturn Workers Vote to Reconsider Nontraditional, Rotating
Work Schedule, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 173, at d9 (Sept. 9, 1994) (initial, pre-contract
negotiations advisory referendum favors ending rotating shifts); Saturn Workers Again Reject
Agreement, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 232, at dl9 (Dec. 6, 1994) (two ratification votes rejecting
proposed contract); Auto Industry: Saturn Corp. Says Its Workers Approve Modifications to Contract,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at d10 (Jan. 17, 1995) (approving contract with renegotiated terms);
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wholly without foundation.
Until now, there has been widespread acceptance on the part of both
labor and management at NUivlMI, that the collective bargaining process
itself is the main forum in which to resolve major topics upon which the
parties' interests diverge, and that adversarialism in the service of the
parties' respective interests need not poison the prevailing cooperative
atmosphere.39 In August of 1994, however, collective bargaining for a
new agreement resulted in the first serious strike threat, albeit one that
was narrowly averted when the parties reached a new agreement shortly
after the strike deadline.40

III. THE NUiv1MI MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY AND

PRODUCTION

SYSTEM

Under the terms of the joint venture, Toyota has control over
manufacturing operations. Both joint venture partners contemplated from
the outset that Toyota's operations in Japan would be the model for
NUMMI,41 with the sole significant exception being the difference
between recognizing and bargaining with an American labor union as
opposed to a Japanese one.42
NUMMI adopted from Toyota its primary mission statement and its
four supporting philosophical policies. The fundamental goal is "to build
products with quality as high as anywhere in the world while ensuring
that costs are the most competitive of any manufacturer."43 Shorter
term goals are adopted annually.44 The team concept is the central
means of accomplishing NUivlMI's goals,45 and it permeates the
company's organizational structures as well as all of NUMMI's
functional processes.

see also UAW Workers Permitted To Apply for Jobs in Traditional GM Plants, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 205, at dl4 (Oct. 26, 1994) (in yet further departures from the original concept, Saturn
employees have the opportunity to transfer back to GM plants, and Saturn workers have decided to
eliminate certain participatory meetings to use the extra time to increase car production).
39. Interview with Martha Quesada, supra note 33.
40. See UA\V, NUMMI Agree on New Pact, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 148, at d18 (Aug. 4,
1994); NUMMI Workers Approve New Four-Year Contract, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 156, at dl4
(Aug. 16, 1994).
41. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 3-4.
42. In the end, however, the plant adapted the Japanese model to more individualistic American
values. See, e.g., Joint Venture, supra note 36, at d20.
43. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 4; Burch Presentation, supra note I.
44. NUMMI Script, supra note I, at 5.
45. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 5, 9.
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NU1\.1MI has also embraced Toyota's four philosophical policies to
support this central mission:
(1)

foster a stable and cooperative relationship between all team
members, particularly between labor and management;
(2) implement the philosophy that "quality should be assured in the
production process itself;"
(3) establish long-term and stable relationships with qualified
suppliers; and
(4) maintain a cooperative, friendly relationship in the community and
maintain a company image of being a fair employer and neighbor.46

NU1\.1MI, like Toyota, has designed its production system around
four central concepts to achieve its twin objectives of highest quality and
lowest cost: (1) just-in-time production; (2) ''jidoka," designing quality
into the production process itself;47 (3) team-based organization of the
workforce and of production, coupled with a philosophical commitment
to full utilization of team members' abilities; and (4) "kaizen," or
continuous improvement of the manufacturing process.48
These
concepts should be thought of as interrelated, integrated, and mutually
reinforcing, rather than independent.49 Together, the process is intended
to ensure that no defects are passed on or overlooked. Instead, all are to
be caught and rectified at the earliest possible point, where the causation
of the problem can be traced and corrected before further defective parts
are produced.50 This process also makes workers far more readily
accountable for their errors or omissions than they would be under more
conventional American manufacturing systems. 51

46. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 5.
47. Jidoka is often equated with Total Quality Management or Total Quality Control in
American terminology. See, e.g., S. Mark Young, A Framework for Successful Adoption and
Performance ofJapanese Manufacturing Practices in the United States, 17 ACAD. OF MOMT. REV.
677, 683 (1992).
48. NUMMI Script, supra note I, at 6.
49. See NUMMI Script, supra note I, at 6.
50. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 6.
51. Young, supra note 47, at 683. For a more detailed description ofNUMMI's organizational
philosophy, manufacturing systems, and labor relations, see Adler, supra note 2, at 97-98; Clair
Brown & Michael Reich, When Does Union-Management Cooperation Work? A Look at NUMMI
and GM-Van Nuys, 31 CAL. MGMT. REV. 26,28 (Summer 1989).
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1. Just-in-Time Production
Just-in-time production is production in which the customer order
"pulls" the product through the manufacturing process, with as little
inventory kept on hand as possible. The materials and parts must arrive
''just-in-time" at the appropriate production station where they are
processed, assembled, or otherwise integrated into the product. This
method keeps costs of parts and materials, as well as storage space
requirements, to a minimum.52 It is essential, however, that materials
arrive on time, or costly delays will result. The workforce is likewise
organized with few utility workers, reserves, or other buffers. While
extremely efficient, this method is also highly vulnerable to disruption in
the event of a labor dispute. From management's point of view, a
successful operation is highly dependent on stable, harmonious labormanagement relations. 53
At NUMMI, Toyota "kanban" or computer card technology is relied
upon to ensure timely arrival of appropriate parts and materials at the
correct sites. The kanban cards determine the flow of parts and material
throughout the facility, control volume and prevent overproduction. The
cards also provide guidance and instruction to the teams of workers
regarding new methods of production.54 The kanban system thus
controls the pace of production and worker slack time. 55
2. "Jidoka" or Total Quality
Jidoka is the philosophy underlying and binding together the
manufacturing method. The central idea is that quality should be
designed into the production process itself, that the process should be
arranged so as to ensure quality. This is primarily accomplished through
designing the product for manufacturability, engineering the manufacturing process to ensure quality, including some production equipment that
can sense malfunctions or product defects, and organizing the work of

52. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 6. This is the reverse of the traditional U.S. "push"-based
manufacturing process, in which workers push the completed sub-assembly through for further manufacturing, followed by the eventual final ''push" by marketing and sales to dispose of the product
via consumer purchase.
53. See, e.g., Young, supra note 47, at 692; John Humphrey, Japanese Production Management
and Labour Relations in Brazil, 30 J. DEV. STUD. 92, 96-97 (1993).
54. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 6.
55. See, e.g., Young, supra note 47, at 686.
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the workers making components, subassemblies and the final product
itself to facilitate and, indeed, require, attention to quality maximization
and elimination of waste. Where team members identify defects, they
are to correct them, if possible, or else pull the Andon cord and stop the
line.56
3.

The Team Concept

The team concept and the goal of full utilization of team members'
abilities constitute the human resources philosophy upon which
NUM:MI's organization is premised.57 Workers are organized into
teams of about five workers each, headed by a team leader. Each team
is responsible for a set of jobs; a piece of the production process. For
example, one team might assemble the chassis of the car, the next might
align it, the third would add the cab, the fourth would add the deck, and
so on.58
All team positions, including that of team leader, are in the UAWrepresented collective bargaining unit. The team leader is roughly
equivalent to "leaders" in many traditional industrial plants, and is paid
an additional sixty cents per hour to coordinate the team's functions. 59
When NUM:MI first reopened the plant, management selected the team
leaders. After several disputes over the fairness of the selection process,
however, the company agreed to the creation of a joint union-management committee, which selects leaders on the basis of a set of collectively-bargained, objective criteria.60
Several teams together form a group, under the direction of a group
leader. The group leader is the front-line supervisor or foreman in
ordinary parlance, but is supposed to exercise authority in a much more
flexible and supportive manner than the traditional, authoritarian
supervisor. Managers, engineers, and other support staff also work

56. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 7; see also NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at
art. XIV,§ 1; art. XXVIII,§ 1.2. See generally Young, supra note 47, at 683.
57. Burch Presentation, supra note 1; NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 5, 7, 9.
58. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1; see also NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1,
at art. XIV, § l.
59. See NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. XIV, § 1.2; art. XVII, § 2.
60. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1; Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 87, 90; see also
NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. XVI; Letter of Understanding from Thomas King,

Jr., NUMMI Manager, Labor Relations, to George Nano, UAW Local 2244 Bargaining Committee
Chairman (July 1, 1991), 1"1111, 5 (on file with author).
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closely with each team, as problems arise. 61
In all matters, the team is intended to function as the primary
problem-solving structure. The team draws upon the expertise, advice,
counsel, and assistance of the managers and technical experts in a
manner less like hierarchical authority and more closely approximating
athletic coaching.62 "An integral part of the management style is a
decision-making process based on consensus by all areas affected by the
decision to be made," according to the company.63 The NUMMI view
is that those who work with the problem, best understand it, and can
contribute the widest possible array of potential solutions for consideration in the decisionmaking process.64
Both the groups of teams, and the company's workforce as a whole
are regarded as larger teams. At each level, teams are expected to pull
together for the common good, the corporate objectives of highest quality
and lowest costs.65
At its start-up, NUM:MI re-hired none of the laid-off GM supervisors.66 This eliminated the risk of supervisory resistance to a management style which pushes authority down to the rank and file worker,
disempowering controlling-style supervision.67 The managerial hierarchy has been flattened from eight managerial levels under GM to five
under NUM:MI.68 There are no industrial engineers because those job
functions have effectively been transferred to the production teams. 69

61. Adler, supra note 2, at 104; see a~o NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. XV,
§ 1.2; art. XXIX, § 1. For another description of the plant hierarchy, see Adler & Cole, supra note
4, at 86.
62. See Burch Presentation, supra note I; NUMMI Script, supra note I, at 5, 7, 9; Gary S.
Vasilash, Reengineering: Your Job May Depend on It, PRODUCTION, June 1993, at 10.
63. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 5.
64. Burch Presentation, supra note 1; Quesada Presentation, supra note 1.
65. NUMMI Script, supra note I, at 9.
66. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1.
67. Many commentators view such resistance as a key obstacle to successful implementation
of worker participation-based forms oflean production. See, e.g., Young, supra note 47, at 691-92;
see also Humphrey, supra note 53, at 107 (detailing the Brazilian experience).
68. See William A. Nowlin, Restructuring In Manufacturing Management, Work and Labor
Relations, 32 INDUS. MGMT. 5, 5-6 (Nov.-Dec. 1990). NUMMI reduced GM's two dozen salaried
managerial classifications to five: president, vice president, general manager, manager, and group
leader. Id.
69. Burch Presentation, supra note I; Robin Y. Bergstrom, NUMMI: Engineering the Process,
105 PRODUCTION 58, 58-59 (June 1993). For the pertinent collective bargaining agreement provisions, see NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. XIV, § 1.1. Team members share
responsibility for participating in quality/productivity improvement programs, such as quality circles
and Kaizen. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. XXVIII, §§ 1.1, 1.2 (establishing and
revising "standardized work."). This also is discussed in Appendix C of the Agreement. See
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Employees usually rotate positions within their teams, typically
about three times a day, although the teams have the option of limiting
or eliminating job rotation. 70 Team members are extensively crosstrained to facilitate both shared problem-solving and job rotation. 71
Nevertheless, teamwork does not eliminate the routine, repetitive
nature of automobile production tasks. On the contrary, as Toyota
boasts, the company's manufacturing methods are Taylorism to the
maximum. 72 Kaizen is the final leg of the four production system
concepts upon which the NUMMI method rests. Kaizen ensures that the
actual manufacturing work performed by the teams is not variable or
creative in the slightest, but rather is wholly dictated by set patterns that
are to be followed unless a defect or production problem is diagnosed.
4.

Kaizen, or Continuous Improvement

The philosophy of kaizen is that the workers should strive forever
to improve the processes under which they work. 73 While Americans
have historically favored major innovations, the Japanese manufacturers
have customarily relied most upon frequent, small, incremental improvements to steadily improve upon previous methods. 74 Kaizen at NUMMI
is an integral part of the team process, based upon empowerment of rank
and file workers to develop such incremental improvements in production
processes, and indeed, imposing upon the teams the obligation to do so
as part of their job responsibilities.75
The time and motion entailed in each piece of the manufacturing
process is broken down and analyzed, and reexamined as finely as
possible, to isolate opportunities for improvement in speed, quantity, or
method. Instead of industrial engineers standing over workers with stop
NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at app. C.; see also Vasilash, supra note 62, at 9, lO
(describing how NUMMI teams developed the production process for building the new I993 model
cars).
70. Burch Presentation, supra note I; Martinez Presentation, supra note I; Quesada
Presentation, supra note I; see also NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. XIV,§ 1.1.
71. Burch Presentation, supra note I; Quesada Presentation, supra note I; Bergstrom, supra
note 69, at 60-61.
72. See Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 86. "[T]he resulting job designs are very Tayloristic
in their narrow scope and gesture-by-gesture regimentation." Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 86.
73. See NUMMI Script, supra note I, at 8.
74. See, e.g., Michele K. Bolton, Imitation Versus Innovation: Lessons To Be Learned from
the Japanese, 2I ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 30, 38-42 {Winter 1993).
75. Burch Presentation, supra note I; NUMMI Script, supra note I, at 5, 7-9; see also
NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. II,§ 1.6; art. XIV,§ 1.1; art. XXVlii, § I.2; app.

c.
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watches, however, at NU1v11vli the teams do tbis essential work themselves, with back-up technical and professional support available upon
their request. Because the employees know their jobs in a thorough and
detailed way, they are able to constantly devise small refinements which
accumulate into large improvements in productivity and quality.76
There is one team on each of the two sbifts performing a particular
operation, and the standardized routine for the job is set by consensus
between the two teams. Team meetings are regularly held for that
purpose, as well as to address incipient problems.77 When two teams
devise divergent standardization routines, often because of physical
differences between the members of each team, a "standardized work
committee" takes into consideration all ergonomic matters and attempts
to reach an optimal solution.78
Because the employees themselves determine the details of the
process, they internalize and accept the changes in a way that seldom
occurs when industrial engineers and management impose production
modifications from above. 79 Moreover, the opportunity to perform such
intellectual tasks provides relief from pure production activities.80
Nevertheless, at NU:tvllvli, the production work itself remains
routinized and repetitive. In fact, "standardized work" is considerably
more fully specified, in every detail of motion and timing, than the
typical assembly line process. Cycle time averages about sixty seconds.
Determination and specification of the optimal motions for every step of
the process, and rigid adherence thereto by the teams, is intended to
eliminate waste of motion, ensure employee safety, and maximize quality
and efficiency.81 As NU1v11vli describes it: "by definition, standardized
work is work done at the bighest efficiency when all tasks at the
worksite are organized into a perfect sequence where all waste can be
eliminated."82 Standardization also ensures that when the first sbift
ends and the second begins, with a car or subassembly only partially
completed, the completion of the product will tum out exactly the same

76. Burch Presentation, supra note 1; Quesada Presentation, supra note 1; Bergstrom, supra
note 69, at 58-59.
77. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1.
78. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1; see also NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1,
at art. XIV,§ 1.1; art. XXVIII,§ 1.2; app. C, at 88-89.
79. Interview with Martha Quesada, sunra note 33; Vasilash, supra note 62, at 10; Bergstrom,
supra note 69, at 60.
80. Interview with Martha Quesada, supra note 33; see also Nowlin, supra note 68, at 6;
Bergstrom, supra note 69, at 60.
81. Bergstrom, supra note 69, at 86, 89, 91; see Adler, supra note 2, at 102-04.
82. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 8.
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as if the first shift had completed the process. 83
Compared to traditional automobile factory workers, NUMMI
workers are expected to perform rapidly and identically, repetitive tasks,
under substantially greater pressure toward perfection, and with the
additional responsibility of spotting, diagnosing, and if necessary
stopping the line to correct either their own errors or those of others. 84
The just-in-time process, and the timing and balancing of the component
jobs within the particular team's work process, makes each team
member's timing and quality dependent upon prior team members'
proper performance. The combination of the just-in-time process, kanban
cards, jidoka, kaizen, and the team structure permit ready identification
of and feedback to any worker whose performance is causing deficiencies
in quality or quantity of productiqn. Employees are therefore motivated
not only by professionalism and loyalty to the company as a whole, and
by fear of loss of employment, but by close peer pressure and group
loyalty toward their team, and by pressure generated by other teams
farther downstream in the production process. 85
Plainly, the motivation works. It induces employees to work
productive1y and effectively, and to share suggestions and improvements
within the team and for the production process as a whole. 86 More
negatively, however, the cumulative process may be viewed as
management's use of "weapons of transparency, surveillance, peer group
pressures in teams, and control between teams," 87 to promote management control over the workforce, offsetting the inherent dependency on
labor built into a just-in-time, worker participation system. 88 These
psychological factors, as well as the more rapid pace of the production
process, have caused a militant wing within the labor movement to label
the process "manageme~t by stress."89

83. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1.
84. Interview with Martha Quesada, supra note 33; Robert Rehder & Howard Finston, How
Is Detroit Responding to Japanese and Swedish Organization and Management Systems, 33 INDUS.
MGMT. 6, 7-8 {1991).
85. See, e.g., Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 8 (noting that "(t]he typical Japanese
transplant team organization is a powerful social control system based on peer pressure.").
86. See Adler, supra note 2, at 105-06; Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 8.
87. Humphrey, supra note 53, at 99.
88. See Humphrey, supra note 53, at 97, 99-100.
89. PARKER & SLAUGHTER. supra note 32, at 16-19.
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5. Practices to Complement The Four Basic Manufacturing Concepts
NUMMI relies upon two other key practices to implement its
foundation philosophy. The first is extensive integration of suppliers
upstream and dealers downstream into the company's operations.90
NUMMI is not quite yet a "boundary-less" corporation,91 but it is much
farther along that path than the typical American corporation.
Second, NUMMI relies heavily upon initial and continuing training
to ensure that its workforce has the requisite skills. NUMMI is
committed to intense investment in its human capital and embraces a
philosophy of promotion from within. The company trains workers in
the job analyzation methodology they will need to perform the technical
activities underlying constant improvement of their manufacturing work.
The company also extensively trains employees in group dynamics,
social and organizational skills which will facilitate the team process. In
pre-team leaders' training, potential team leaders receive more intensive
education in such topics. In addition, NUMMI and the UAW have a
joint apprenticeship training program, to permit semi-skilled workers to
promote from within into the craft positions in the plant.92
NUMMI has a training and development section budgeted at about
$800,000 per year, and workers average at least forty hours of training
per year, plus separate training in the event of promotion. Toyota's
approach, embraced by NUMMI, is not to compute separately, detailed
training cost analyses. The company views training as a long-term
investment in its human capital, which will eventually reap its own
reward. 93 A typical U.S. business devotes its training budget to about

90. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 5, 10; Martinez Presentation, supra note 1. Professor
Badaracco summarizes relations between Toyota, the model for NUMMI, and its suppliers:
Toyota exercises hegemonic influence over its family of suppliers. It usually buys a large
fraction of their output, often helps finance them, provides equipment and managerial
advice, and sometimes lends its executives to them. Above all, it has integrated their
production operations, intricately and intimately, with its assembly operations throughJIT
(just-in-time) supplying.
Badaracco, supra note 14, at 14; see also Katz & MacDuffie, supra note 37, at 192; Joel CutcherGershenfeld & Patrick P. McHugh, Competition and Divergence: Collective Bargaining in the Nonh
American Auto Supply Industry, in CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE
SECTOR 225, 230 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1994) (discussing integration between transplants and just-intime suppliers); accord Kenney and Florida, supra note 15, at 24, 26, 28-29.
91. For a broader discussion of the "boundary-less" corporation, see Frederick E. Webster, Jr.,
The Changing Role of Marketing in the Corporation, 56 J. OF MKTG. 1, 12 (Oct. 1992).
92. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1; Burch Presentation, supra note 1.
93. Martinez Presentation, supra note 1.
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ten percent of its employees, primarily managerial level.
regularly provides training to all of its employees.94
lY.

A.

THE

[Vol. 13:2

NUMMI

COLLECTNE BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP AND LABOR
RELATIONS

Labor-Management Relations as Embodied in the Text of the
Labor Agreement

The collective bargaining agreement, and the labor-management
relationship that it establishes, are distinctive in many respects.
Emphasizing that the relationship is to be one of mutual trust and
respect,95 the agreement incorporates certain key features to implement
this philosophy, together with the team concept96 and the production
methods described previously.97
1. Information and Consultation

First, NUMMI agrees to provide the UAW with advance information
about all major business issues, including semi-annual business plans,
major organizational changes, the company's long range plans and
policies, quarterly production schedules, contemplated outsourcing or
insourcing decisions, and technological changes which will affect
bargaining unit work. 98 Obligatory information-sharing goes far beyond
mandatory subjects of bargaining. Moreover, as to the broad range of
matters directly relating to terms and conditions of employment, the
company agrees to provide advance information and to engage in
advance consultation with the union. 99
The collective bargaining agreement establishes multiple forums for
information sharing, and structures a somewhat sequential process as
NUMMI decisions move through concretization and into implementation.
Typically, discussions begin as early, informal "advance information"

94. See Nowlin, supra note 68, at 7-9; Vasilash, supra note 5, at 40.
95. Burch Presentation, supra note I; NUMMI Script, supra note I, at 9; NUMMI-UAW
AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. I, § l.l; art. IX, § I.
96. See NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. II, §§ 1.3, 1.6; art. XIV.
97. See NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. II,§§ 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 1.6.
98. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. II, § 1.4; see also NUMMI-UAW
AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. XXVIII,§ 1.3 (listing monthly production schedule meetings).
99. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. II,§ 1.4.
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discussions. As operational decisions begin to evolve, further discussions
ensue in meetings under more formal, top level, and later section level,
"joint conferences." In addition, the agreement provides for formal,
frequent, round-table communications among company and union leaders
in both executive and sectional level conferences, at which both sides
keep their opposite numbers broadly informed and share mutual
concerns, focusing on specific, operational decisions, especially those
affecting the workforce. Lines of communication in both directions are
thereby kept wide open, whether the corporate or union matter is linked
to employment directly, indirectly, or not at al1. 100
This labor-management relationship has sharply departed from the
traditional "the company acts, the union reacts" scenario. Instead, the
company attempts to work out an agreement with the union prior to the
finalization and implementation of important changes affecting employees.Ioi
2.

Consensus-based Problem-solving and Advance Agreement in
Lieu of Adversarial Grievance Dispute Resolution

Second, the grievance procedure is characterized as a "nonconfrontational, problem-resolution procedure based on discussion and
consensus." 102 In structure, the details differ little from a typical
collectively-bargained grievance and arbitration procedure. 103 The
contractual verbiage, however, is more conciliatory, and less adversarial
and litigious in tone. 104 Moreover, the attitudes of the participants in
100. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. IX, §§ 1-2; Letter of Understanding from
Thomas King, Jr., NUMMI Manager, Labor Relations, to George Nano, UAW Local 2244
Bargaining Committee Chairman (July 1, 1991), ~ 8 (attached to NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT); see
also Burch Presentation, supra note 1; Martinez Presentation, supra note 1.
101. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. II, § 1.4.
102. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 9.
103. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note l, at art. X. The "Problem Resolution Procedure"
sets forth a pyramid dispute resolution process similar to those in more traditional, automobile
industry agreements.
104. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. X. For example, the NUMMI-UAW
Agreement grievance procedure provisions include the following language:
Because of the value and importance of full discussion in clearing up misunderstandings
and preserving harmonious relations, every reasonable effort shall be made to resolve
problems promptly at this point through discussion. The resolution of an employee
problem at this stage shall not set a precedent or a binding past practice on either party.
NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. X,§ 2.2.
The agreement reflects this approach in multiple provisions. The introductory language
provides: "[i]n the administration of this Agreement, and in our day-to-day relationship, we will
exhibit mutual trust, understanding and sincerity, and, to the fullest extent possible, will avoid
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utilizing the process are far more cooperative on all sides. 105 Union
representation is farther removed from the shop floor compared to a
typical auto industry collective bargaining agreement, with more
employees per union representative, 106 and with consultation regarding
grievances arranged for employee break-time to minimize disruption of
production. 107 Most significantly, many issues are resolved by advance
agreement oflabor and management, exempting them from the grievance
and arbitration process entirely. 108 NUMMI's rate of grievances and
arbitration is minuscule, and contrasts sharply with the inordinately high
rate of grievance filings and arbitrations when the plant was operated by
GM.1o9
3.

Job Security

Third, the company commits to a job security clause recognizing its
confrontational tactics." NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. I, § 1.2. Among the
parties' mutual commitments and responsibilities, they agree to ''resolve employee concerns through
procedures using problem solving and non-adversarial techniques that are based on consensus instead
of confrontation." NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. II,§ 1.3.
105. The role of the "union coordinator" at the informal, first step of the procedure is explicitly
cooperative, rather than confrontational. See NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. X,
§ 2.2 ("clearing up misunderstandings and preserving harmonious relations.''). The role of the
district committeeperson is defined to be both cooperative and confrontational. See NUMMI-UAW
AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. VIII, § 6.2. Section 6 notes that duties include
meeting with the Company to resolve complaints under the Problem Resolution
Procedure; [p]articipating with the Company in Standards of Conduct and Attendance
Counselling Committees; [j]oint investigations with the Company in potential suspension/discharge cases; [r]epresent[ing] an employee ... in disciplinary action that may
result in suspension or discharge; and ... cooperating with the company in implementing
Labor Relations Policies such as attendance control, vacation scheduling, safety records,
call-in duties, lost-time accident reports, and leaves of absence.
NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. VIII, § 6. The rank and file's perception that
some committeepersons and bargaining committee members were insufficiently identified with
workers' interests probably was a key factor in electoral turnover in these offices. Quesada
interview, supra note 33.
106. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1. Employees are to see their ''union coordinator"
regarding unresolved problems. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. X, § 2.1. There
is one coordinator for every two groups, producing a fairly low employee to representative ratio.
NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. VIII, §10.1. At the second level, however, the
contract provides for 10 or 12 district committeepersons, representing some 3,500 bargaining unit
employees. A more typical automobile industry ratio would be 250:1, or less. NUMMI-UAW
AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. VIII, § 5.1.
107. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. VIII,§ 10.3; art. X,§ 2.1.
108. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. X, § 1.1 (exempting those employee
"problems" subject to other resolution procedures).
109. See Adler, supra note 2, at 99. Grievances decreased from 2000 pending when GMFremont closed to 700 filed at NUMMI over an eight year period. Adler, supra note 2, at 99.
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"responsibility, with the cooperation of the Union, to provide stable
employment to the workers ... [and agreeing] that it will not lay off
employees unless compelled to do so by severe economic conditions that
threaten the long term financial viability of the Company." 110 In
addition, NUMMI commits to taking "affirmative measures before laying
off any employees," including, but not limited to, reducing the salaries
of NUMMI officers and management, and reassigning work normally
performed by subcontractors to qualified bargaining unit employees. 111
The company is very proud of this clause, although it was initially
reluctant to reduce it to writing, and to enforceably commit to this
longstanding, oft-stated corporate policy. 112 Nevertheless the company
has, so far, thoroughly adhered to this commitment. In 1987, car sales
were slow and production schedules were drastically cut. The company,
instead of opting for layoffs, provided all workers with forty hours of
training on topics such as job safety, work standards, and problem
solving. People were rotated between those jobs and production work,
and everyone remained on the active, full-time payroll. 113 Similarly,
during annual model change-overs, unlike traditional automobile plants,
NUMMI does not close down, but conducts training and employs
unoccupied workers on deferred plant maintenance projects, such as
painting the walls. 114
This policy has built immense trust in a workforce inured to the GM
tradition of layoffs roughly every year because of model changes and
market fluctuations. The NUMMI commitment to job security has
reinforced the employees' willingness to make productivity improvement
suggestions they might otherwise withhold. As Ms. Quesada put it:
I ... as a regular worker ... in my department can make changes
within my system. The only reason I am willing to do that is because
I have been guaranteed that no matter what jobs I eliminate no one will
be laid-off. Now if you had ever told me that the gentleman on my
right was going to lose his job as a result of my improving something,
as a result of my installing a robot that is now doing his job, I
would've never done it. There is no way that I as a good union person

110. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. III.
111. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. III.
112. NUMMI boasts that the clause "is considered to be the strongest in the industry." NUMMI
Script, supra note 1, at 9.
113. Burch Presentation, supra note 1.
114. Burch Presentation, supra note 1.
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would help management in eliminating a job. 115

Because of the job security covenant, she could explain that "what
we have done is made changes that improve things for workers" by
installing robots to perform particularly difficult and injurious tasks, such
as seat installation. n6
4.

Flexible Attendance and Acceptance of the Worker As A Mature
Adult

Fourth, there is a flexible attendance policy which treats employees
like adults, assuming they will miss work only for important family and
personal reasons. 117 There are no time clocks. 118 This trust is bolstered, in practice, by the powerful peer pressure exerted by remaining
team members who must pick up the slack for the absent co-worker. 119
5.

Advance Consultation With the Union in Major Disciplinary
Cases

Fifth, the company agrees to review, with union officials, mitigating
circumstances prior to suspension or discharge of a worker. 120 Again,
this modifies the traditional "employer decision, union grievance"
scenario in favor of attempts to reach consensus in advance of the
decision.
6.

Greatly Broadened Job Classifications

Sixth, the number of job classifications is sharply reduced, from
over 100 in the GM era to three, one for production work, and two for
skilled trades, ensuring NUMMI a maximally flexible workforce. 121

115. Quesada Presentation, supra note I.
116. Quesada Presentation, supra note I.
117. Martinez Presentation, supra note I; see also NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I,
at art. XXIII.
118. Burch Presentatio~, supra note 1.
119. See, e.g., Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 8.
120. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. X,§ 11.2.
121. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. XVII,§ 1.1. Article XVII, section 1.1
lists three classifications: Division I (production) and Division II (general maintenance and tool and
die). NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. XVII, § 1.1; see Vasilash, supra note 5, at
39.
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7. Employees Empowered To Stop The Assembly Line
Seventh, the broad "no-strike" clause applies to all disputes, but the
employees are nevertheless trusted and expected to pull the Andon cord
and stop the assembly line when necessary for reasons of safety as well
as production quality. 122
8. Enhanced Security For The Union
In the spirit of mutual trust and the expectation of a stable
relationship, NUMMI has also agreed to a form of organizational security
for the union, as well as job security for the individual employees. The
parties have signed a letter of understanding which affords the union the
option of card check recognition, in the event that future facilities are
opened by NUMMI. 123

9.

Overall

Perhaps most important is the overall approach of the agreement.
It is much shorter and less detailed than a typical UAW collective
bargaining agreement, and many of the commitments contained in it are
broader and more general. These provisions are aimed at capturing
shared purposes and intent, rather than pinning down details in anticipation of breach of contract and arbitral enforcement. 124 The union
abandons conventional "job control" strategies. In return, it gains the
subtler power built into the vulnerability to disruption of a manufacturing
process highly dependent upon the good will and strenuous voluntary
efforts of workers, as well as the union's explicit participatory role in
consensus-oriented strategic and functional decisionmaking processes.
While based upon Japanese cultural approaches to contractual relationships built upon mutual trust, 125 the NUMMI-UAW contract also
accords more closely to the model of the collective bargaining agreement
as laying a constitutional foundation of principles guiding the parties'

122. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. XXVII,§ 12 (prohibition of strikes and
lockouts); art. XXVIII, § 1.2 (permitting stopping the assembly line without risk of discipline).
123. Letter of Understanding from D.W. Childs, Vice President of Human Resources to Bruce
Lee, Director, Region 6, UAW (June 30, 1988), 1]3 (attached to NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT); see
also Quesada Presentation, supra note I.
124. Burch Presentation, supra note I.
125. Burch Presentation, supra note I.
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relationship, and then serving as a living document under which they
negotiate the resolution of particular problems as they arise. Such a
relationship epitomizes the philosophy of trust underlying this form of
labor-management cooperation.
B.

Employee Relations

The company encapsulates its employee relations philosophy in four
summarizing concepts:
1)
2)
3)
4)

mutual trust and respect;
teamwork and the team concept;
equity and fair treatment; and
employee involvement. 126

The company has taken steps to eliminate nearly all of the
traditional indicia of corporate hierarchy, such as separate enclosed
offices, different clothing, separate parking areas or dining rooms. 127
Rather, NUMIVII embraces the concept that each worker is a member of
the company-wide team, making an appropriate contribution to its overall
success, and entitled to be equally valued and treated with dignity and
respect. 128
NUMIVII follows a philosophy of training and promoting from
within, including a vigorous joint (labor-management) apprenticeship
training program for skilled jobs, which has so far graduated about fifty
apprentices. 129
NUMIVII's policy of teamwork and employee involvement embraces
the notion of pushing decision-making down to the lowest possible
level. 130 Employees do not merely participate by reorganizing the work
in which they are immediately involved. Through a company-wide
suggestion program, employees are able to suggest improvements in
operations at all levels. The average participation rate in such programs

126. Burch Presentation, supra note 1; NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 12; see also NUMMIUAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. II,§ 1.3; art. XIV,§ 1.1.
127. Burch Presentation, supra note 1. Contrast this with Quesada's recollection of being forced
out of the GM-Fremont salaried employees' ladies room, when she attempted to use it during a visit
to the front office. Quesada presentation, supra note 1.
128. Burch Presentation, supra note 1; see also NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at
art. II, § 1.6; art. XIV, § 1.1.
129. Burch Presentation, supra note 1; see also NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at
art. XXIX (detailing the apprenticeship training program).
130. Burch Presentation, supra note I.
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in the U.S. is about fifteen or twenty percent, but at NUMMI in 1993,
ninety~four percent of employees participated through one or more
suggestions, totalling over 14,000. 131 With an average of three sugges~
tions per year per worker, 132 it is evident that many employees actively
participate. No doubt this is because NUMMI management consistently
implements a high proportion of the suggestions. 133
The workforce at NUMMI is extremely racially diverse, approximately thirty percent female, although there are only a few women in
skilled trades. 134 It has taken a while for management to adjust to
working with such a diverse, nonhomogeneous workforce. 135

V.

EMPLOYEE ATIITUDES AND SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION

The most moving portion of the NUMMI workshop at the LaJolla
conference was the remarks of Martha Quesada. She is a long-time GM
Fremont plant assembly line worker and militant UAW member, now
employed at NUMMI as an electrician, after completing the NUMMI
apprenticeship training program. A central question regarding many of
the corporate experiments in teams, worker participation, and lean
production, is whether workers actually prefer involvement. Several
commentators have contended that the heightened responsibility, faster
pace, and greater stress inherent in teamwork~based lean production are
outweighed only by employees' fear of job loss, in inducing cooperative
attitudes. 136 Ms. Quesada was a forceful advocate for the view that
participation enriches the work and dignifies the worker, yet she retains
some deep ambivalence.
She vividly described the intense, mutual hostility between worker
and supervisor, union member and management, that pervaded the GM
system, workers' derogatory views about the quality of their own
products, and their feeling of being just additional, fungible parts for the

131. Burch Presentation, supra note 1; see also Tibbett L. Speer, Foreign Investors: An Equity
Stake in California, 27 CAL. Bus. 22, 27 (Mar. 1992) (citing 92% of employees as offering
suggestions in 1991 ).
132. Burch Presentation, supra note 1.
133. In 1991, for example, approximately 85% of employee suggestions were implemented.
Speer, supra note 131, at 27.
134. Quesada Presentation, supra note I.
135. Quesada Presentation, supra note I.
136. See PARKER & SLAUGHTER, supra note 32, at 16-19; Katz & MacDuffie, supra note 37,
at 194-95; Rehder, supra note 32, at 89-90; Young, supra note 47, at 685-88; Rehder & Finston,
supra note 84, at 8.
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company to use in manufacturing automobiles. 137
As a result,
[W]hen NUMMI opened, the former GM workers were adamant about
this new system not working. . . . We felt that it was a sellout. We
felt that ... we as a union would really have no voice. . . . [T]here
was debate on how you handled something like what NUMMI was
proposing to us, ... to this group of militant people and people who
had only been treated like dirt by GM management .... 138

After extensive negotiations among both parent corporations and the
UAW,
you get this agreement, and after you come up with all these beautiful
words about mutual trust and respect, how do you get people like
myself to buy into it? ... How do you really take the words and the
phrases and the cliches and make them work? . . . It's my personal
opinion that, unfortunately, it takes a crisis before you can cooperate.
In our situation, it was the plant closing and it was the end of a
lifestyle for us. 139

Ms. Quesada had such a strong reputation as a militant trade
unionist that she had to work hard to persuade the NUMMI labor
relations department that she could be trained to be a cooperative,
productive employee under its system. Nevertheless, she estimated that
it took her only about six months, rather than several years, of working
under NUMMI management to transform her initial skepticism and
suspicion into belief. 140
Ms. Quesada described the immense resocialization task facing
NUMMI management as they rehired GM workers and reopened the
plant. NUMMI had ''to take ... people who don't believe you, people
who don't trust you, people who had never known management to be
honest in any sense of the word and convince them that what [NUMMI
was] saying [was] going to work." 141
She now feels very differently about her job at NUMMI. "I happen
to love working where I work. I've gone through training programs that
would never have been available to me at General Motors. I've ... had

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Quesada Presentation, supra note
Quesada Presentation, supra note
Quesada Presentation, supra note
Quesada Presentation, supra note
Quesada Presentation, supra note

1; Interview with Martha Quesada, supra note 33.
1.
1.
1.

1.
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opportunities that were never given to me before." 142
Quesada is not atypical. NUMMI surveys its workforce annually.
The proportion of employees declaring themselves satisfied or very
satisfied with their employment has risen steadily, from 76% in 1987, to
85% in 1989, to 90% in 1991. 143 Even the members of the local
union's dissident caucus prefer NUMMI management methods to those
of General Motors. They would prefer to reduce the pace of work,
eliminate alleged favoritism in certain types of assignments, and put
greater distance into the relationship between management and union
representatives, but they support the team-based production system as a
whole. 144
Describing her local union's relationship with NUMMI management,
Ms. Quesada said, "Our union is still the UAW, and we can be a very
strong union, [but] we're a more cooperative union. [T]he antagonism
wasn't working... .'' 145
Ms. Quesada is enthusiastic about a company which treats its
employees as full members of its team and as dignified human beings.
Still, when pressed about trade union antagonism toward lean production
methods and the impact of such methods on the role of the union, Ms.
Quesada retreated in describing her motives, from the carrot to the stick.
Her fears and guilt about being a "traitor to the trade union movement"
revive when she is confronted with such accusations from within her own
local union, from other local unions within the UAW, from the Canadian
Auto Workers union, and from unions in other industries. 146
She expressed some concern about the altered role of the union,
particularly in shop floor representation, but Ms. Quesada then explained
her bottom line:
I've always been a very strong union person and I believe strongly in
unions and hope never to have to work in a non-union shop again.
But ... until you've walked in our shoes and been out of work for two
years and had people kill themselves and had families divorce and had
essentially lost everything that you ever owned, . . . you can't criticize

142. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1.
143. Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 87. This is consonant with several studies suggesting that
many workers derive increased job satisfaction from genuinely participatory working arrangements.
See, e.g., Paula B. Voos, Introduction -An Economic Perspective on Contemporary Trends in
Collective Bargaining, in CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN TilE PRIVATE SECfOR I, 5
(Paula B. Voos ed., 1994).
144. See Turner, supra note 2, at 234-35.
145. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1.
146. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1.
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Ifyou (had a] community of seven thousand workers and a plant closed
down and someone came along with a system that would allow you to
bring back four thousand of those workers, what would you say? ...
I wish . . . I could say that I will walk out on any issue, on any
principle that matters that much to me, I've always felt that way....
[T]he competition internationally [meant]. .. that we could not continue
in the way the Big Three, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler, were
continuing to do business. And we as a union had gotten so militant
and so strong that we were kind of biting our nose off to spite our face.
I think a lot of it has to do with different [economic and legal]
situations, but I admire your [more militant, Canadian] unions and if I
could subscribe to that, trust me, I'd be right behind you. 147
VI.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF NUI\.1MI SUCCESS

The NUI\.1MI success story is founded on changes in structures,
changes in processes and changes in attitudes, compared to operations
under GM. NUI\.1MI management brought with them expectations of
honesty, bard work, participation, and faithful performance by the
employees, and attitudes of trust and cooperation. Once employees
became persuaded that these attitudes were genuine, reciprocation spread
gradually among the workforce. It is evident that the interaction of all
three facets- structure, processes, and organizational culture- is at the
root of NUI\.1MI's success. No one component standing alone would
have sufficed to produce the results.
A series of inquiries naturally follows. Which aspects of the
NUI\.1MI system are essential, which are modifiable, which are dispensable? What background factors are significant in the success of this style
of work organization, and bow adaptable is it across industries? Why
have seemingly similar programs elsewhere proven less successful?
Some comparisons shed light on these questions, although valid answers
are embedded in nuances of corporate culture and workplace context,
making analysis and generalization difficult.
It is helpful to review the old, command and control workplace
model, and the main factors underlying its current breakdown. The old
model was based on routinized jobs, unskilled or semi-skilled work,
specialization and extensive division oflabor, rigid, highly formalized job

147. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1.
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descriptions and many layers of bureaucratic hierarchy. It was originally
developed to facilitate mass production.
Three major factors are leading to its decline. First, the command
and control model was designed for an environment of stable mass
production, abundant natural resources, and economies of scale. This
structure copes poorly with sudden and rapid shifts of demand now
prevalent in an era of short product life cycles and niche markets.
Second, full utilization of new manufacturing technologies is incompatible with the division of labor between brains and brawn, management
and labor, inherent in the command and control model.
Third, the tacit, job control-based, social contract between labor and
big business has broken down. The desirability to both sides has
plummeted regarding an arrangement in which employers paid workers
well to permit management to do all of the decisionmaking. Workers
prefer to use their minds, and employers seek to draw upon their ideas.
The economic presuppositions for the social contract no longer apply in
many industries. The unions' strike weapon has weakened, and the
extent of unionization has decreased. Hence unions' ability to remove
wages from competition has deteriorated. The employers' ability to pass
on wage increases through higher prices to consumers has declined under
the pressure of global competition. 148
In contrast to the hierarchical, rigid, old system, commentators
describe the successful organizational mode of the future as one fostering
initiative, drive, quality, productivity, flexibility, continuous improvement, continuous learning, and a shared sense of purpose among the
workforce, qualities precluded by the traditional mode of work organization. Many observers now believe that organizational learning is the key
to future corporate profitability and that "high trust" and "high mutual
commitment" organizations, such as NUMMI, are best positioned to
succeed in the competitive environment of the future. 149
This brief review highlights two areas in which the NUMMI model
bears only limited application because the environment has not altered
along the lines sketched out above. First, non-manufacturing employ-

148. John F. Tomer, The Social Causes of Economic Decline: Organizational Failure and
Red/ining, 50 REv. OF Soc. ECON. 61, 70-71 (Mar. 1992); see also Marshall, supra note 3, at 28890.
149. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 3, at 302; Tomer, supra note 148, at 74; Raymond F.
Zammuto & Edward J. O'Connor, Gaining Advanced Manufacturing Technologies' Benefits: The
Roles of Organization Design and Culture, 17 ACAD. OF MGMT. REv. 701, 717-18 (1992); Ernest
J. Savoie, Rough Terrain for Collective Bargaining: A Management View, in CONTEMPORARY
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN TilE PRIVATE SECfOR 529, 534 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1994).
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ment, while traditionally subject to hierarchical, bureaucratic management, has otherwise varied tremendously in its conformity to a job
control model and involves productivity and quality variables that may
be harder to measure than those in manufacturing, both in the past and
today. Separate consideration should be given to quality improvement,
productivity, and quality of work life justifications for both old and new
methods of work organization in service sector workplaces. Second,
within manufacturing, in those industries where long production runs and
economies of scale continue to dominate, and particularly if other aspects
of historic conditions remain intact, the command and control model may
be more efficient than any alternative.
Team-based organization may have been oversold as the key to
success in a wide range of business organizations. Teams are especially
valuable in businesses requiring flexibility. In industries where products
or services are seldom modified, traditional hierarchical structures may
be more efficient. On the other hand, if products or services are too
variable, the time entailed in coordination and reorganization of team
efforts may outweigh productivity gains, making individual-based
operations more successful. 150 In manufacturing, the standardized work
aspect ofNUM:MI's lean production model is probably subject to similar
constraints. 151
Moreover, the utility of team-based production depends upon the
extent to which within each team, the jobs of team members are, or can
be, redesigned as interdependent. The successful completion of the work
for which the team is responsible should depend heavily on collective,
rather than individual effort, and successful performance of individual
tasks should demand close and frequent coordination among team
members. Team size should also remain small, ranging from five to ten
members. 152
An industry may satisfY other pre-conditions for success with a lean

150. See Kathryn M. Bartol & Laura L. Hagmann, Team-Based Pay Plans: A Key to Effective
Teamwork, 24 COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REV. 24, 27 (Nov. 1992); Paul S. Adler & Robert E.
Cole, Rejoinder, 35 SLOAN MGMT. REv. 45,48 (Winter 1994); cf. Maryellen R. Kelley & Bennett
Harrison, Unions, Technology, and Labor-Management Cooperation, in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC
COMPETITIVENESS 247, 266-69 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds., 1992) (finding that
employee participation programs render produdtion significantly less efficient in nonunion plants,
and not significantly more efficient in metalworking and machinery sector unionized plants.
Unionized plants were more efficient than nonunion, regardless of worker participation programs.)
151. See Adler & Cole, supra note 150, at 48.
152. Bartol & Hagmann, supra note 150, at 25-27. Adler & Cole also limit their belief in the
superiority of lean production coupled with worker participation to the context of high volume, fairly
repetitive, labor-intensive production. Adler & Cole, supra note 150, at 48-49.
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production, team-based system, but find that existing technology renders
it inefficient to reorganize work for teams of five to ten with interdependent functions. Factors regarding the suitability of the industry, its
external environment, and technological constraints on the organization
of manufacturing operations may account for much of the divergence of
experience with team-based, lean production. Studies of new production
organization which aggregate data may obscure such important,
differentiating variables.
NUMMI is the quintessential, lean production, worker participation
company in most respects, but its distinctive features bear noting.
Because it has operated so successfully with an independent, industrial
union, it belies the argument that Japanese and similar lean production
methods cannot be accomplished in a unionized environment. Indeed,
some recent research suggests that, at least in the U.S., most non-union
employee involvement programs fail because of the lack of autonomy
and enforceable job security of the employee groups, while programs in
unionized settings are more likely to succeed because the unions and
workers have enough independent leverage to press for significant
change. 153
NUMMI also calls into question the contention that "greenfield"
operations are far more successful with lean production methods than
converting existing plants and workforce. 154 Greater initial skill and
understanding may be required of management to build trust with a
suspicious workforce, but thereafter, there appears to be little difference
in long term success. The six month period required for Martha
Quesada's change in attitude, if typical, suggests that a mass attitudinal
shift to a new corporate culture is more feasible, in far shorter time, than
often assumed.
NUMMI did not rehire members of GM's lower and middle
management. The wholesale change was certainly important in
persuading workers that the new: management had internalized very

153. See Kelley & Harrison, supra note 150, at 255-56, 275-76; Brown, supra note 3, at 43-44,
46.
154. See Thomas A. Mahoney & John R. Deckop, Y'gotta Believe: Lessons from American-vs.
Japanese-Run U.S. Factories, ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 27 (Spring 1993) (concluding that the
success of Japanese manufacturing models in U.S. plants is mainly dependent upon managerial
values). Apparently, GM has successfully retrained for lean production teams of auto workers
formerly employed in the brownest of possible settings, the state-owned East German Wartburg
plant, now owned by Opel. See Karen L. Miller & Kathleen Kerwin, GM's German Lessons, Bus.
WK., Dec. 20, 1993, at 67, 68.
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different attitudes towards workers , than their predecessors. 155 Moreover, supervisors and middle managers often pose a greater obstacle to
innovative labor-management relations schemes than rank and file
workers because of managers' reluctance to accede power and position
to their subordinates. 156
NUMMI follows a philosophy contrary to the recommendations of
most experts, in providing no gainsharing or productivity or skill
improvement rewards for individuals or teams, but only a small bonus
for the entire hourly workforce if their products meet external recognition
goals. 157 Pride in product, a good day's pay for a hard day's work, and
identification with the company as a whole through membership in the
larger "team," have produced sufficient motivating forces to yield
NUMMI's outstanding results. NUMMI's ongoing investment in training
the entire workforce in teamwork-related empowerment techniques no
doubt also contributes to its success. 158
NUMMI relies less on the new generation of high technology
systems automation than many other automobile plants, either in Japan
or in the U.S. 159 The company believes that "the key to productivity
is simplicity," 160 because "automation is not as flexible as a multiskilled worker." 161 Central to the successful NUMMI philosophy is the

155. Quesada Presentation, supra note I.
156. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 3, at 45; see also Humphrey, supra note 53, at 107; Zammuto
& O'Connor, supra note 149, at 718 (commenting that ''these changes disrupt existing power and
status networks making significant resistance likely as well as costly and time-consuming to
overcome.'').
157. The Performance Improvement Plan Sharing program [hereinafter PIPS], establishing a
maximum annual bonus of $1,600 per employee is outlined in the Letter of Understanding from
Thomas King, Jr., Manager, Labor Relations, to George Nano, Chairman, Bargaining Committee
(July I, 1991), ~ 9 and attached Exhibit "A" (attached to NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT). See also
Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 87. For a description of recommended forms regarding merit or
incentive pay practices designed to accompany lean production and team-based manufacturing, see
generally Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 90; Bartol & Hagmann, supra note 150, at 27-29. NUMMI
may have chosen to follow W.E. Deming's philosophy in avoiding such compensation systems. He
disapproves of incentive pay systems because they inevitably require appropriate forms of work
measurement, creating the risk that the workers will "game the system" to maximize their own
personal rewards instead of focusing on company goals. See Sanjiv Sarin, Can Work Measurement
and TQM Get Along? 25 INDUS. ENGINEERING 14-15 (Oct. 1993).
158. Cf Brown, supra note 3, at 44 (one reason so many corporate experiments in employee
involvement fail is management's unwillingness to invest time and money in pertinent training);
Nowlin, supra note 68, at 7-9.
159. See, e.g., Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 21; Marshall, supra note 3, at 302.
160. Kevin L. Miller, The Factory Guru Tinkering with Toyota, Bus. WK., May 17, 1993, at 95
(quoting Toyota Director of Production Engineering Mikio Kitano, formerly employed at NUMMI).
161. Id. (quoting Professor Koichi Shimokawa).
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proposition that "men control machines, not the other way around." 162
NUMMI's prospects for success were greatly advanced by its
determination to avoid layoffs in 1987, despite the sharp reduction in
production. Analysts universally agree with the thrust of Martha
Quesada's comments, that absent a deep managerial commitment to job
security for employees, workers will be unwilling to participate in
improving productivity when they may be improving themselves or
coworkers right out of a job. 163
Finally, the crisis generated by GM's closure of the plant drastically
altered the thinking and behavior of the union, workers, and community.
The NUMMI workforce has been characterized as traumatized by the
previous plant closure and desperately fearful of employment loss. 164
NUMMI fits within the broad pattern of "crisis to cooperation," despite
the company technically being a new operation. Nevertheless, the factor
may be overemphasized in many accounts; later hires not involved in the
plant closure are indistinguishable from more senior workers in their
enthusiasm about working at NUMMI.
Comparisons ofNUMMI to other automobile industry operations are
instructive in holding constant for "hard," industry-based constraints,
highlighting the significance of human relations factors. Team-based
operation, in any industry, requires that: (1) management at all levels
fully support the team concept; (2) the norms, beliefs and values of the
company include mutual trust, respect, and confidence, and the organizational culture as a whole encourage both vertical and horizontal
cooperation among employees; (3) the company have a flat organizational hierarchy; and (4) the company have flexible communication
channels, good communication skills, and an open flow of information.165 The NUMMI organization, top to bottom, epitomizes these
factors.
One may profitably compare the use of the Japanese lean production/worker participation model at NUMMI with its less successful

162. /d.
163. See, e.g., Adrienne E. Eaton & Paula B. Voos, Unions and Contemporary Innovations in
Work Organization, Compensation, and Employee Participation, in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC
COMPETITIVENESS 173, 195-96 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eels., 1992) (arguing that "job
loss, reduced amount of employment, and wage reductions are all feared"); Kelley & Harrison, supra
note 150, at 256-57; Voos, supra note 143, at 5; Nowlin, supra note 68, at 9, 30; see also
Humphrey, supra note 53, at 103-04 (detailing a Brazilian study).
164. See Turner, supra note 2, at 6. "In the minds ofNUMMI employees, job security is closely
tied to continued high levels of productivity, quality, and constant improvement." Rehder & Finston,
supra note 84, at 7-8.
165. Bartol & Hagmann, supra note 150, at 25-27.
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adaptation at several other automobile transplant and joint venture
facilities. These and other Japanese transplants started out espousing a
common set of formal structures and organizational values, including the
team concept, a quest for perfection as to both quality and quantity
(jidoka and kaizen), mutual trust, stable employment, win-win labor
management relations or harmonious employee relations, and just-in-time
inventories. 166
However, the gap between conception and execution seems to have
been considerably greater at other transplant facilities than at NUJMMI.
NUlMMI has, at least so far, managed to transplant key intangibles which
have fallen by the way side in many of the other Japanese transplant
operations: openness, sharing of both power and information, a culture
of shared membership in a team running throughout all vertical and
horizontal relationships in the plant, and a hostility to the opposite-turf
control, power brokering, information hoarding. 167
The collective bargaining relationships between CAMI and the
Canadian Auto Workers ("CAW''), covering the OM-Suzuki joint venture
in Ingersoll, Ontario; between AutoAlliance, Inc. and the UAW, covering
the Mazda-Ford joint venture in Flat Rock, Michigan; and between
Diamond Star Motors Corp. and the UAW, a Mitsubishi-Chrysler joint
venture in Normal, Illinois; as well as the non-union Subaru-Isuzu joint
venture automobile plant in Lafayette, Indiana, represent less successful
efforts to institute teamwork-based, intensified work, continuous
improvement, lean production models. In each of these plants, aspects
of the Japanese model eventually broke down because of what workers
perceived as broken promises of shared decisionmaking on the job. If
a proposed manufacturing practice strongly affected both the bottom line
and workers' job conditions, or in some plants, if the supervisor's own
power or interests were at stake, "consensus" was only possible on
management's terms. 168 In addition, in at least some cases, the trans-

166. Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 6.
167. See Bergstrom, supra note 69, at 60; see also Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 89-91.
168. See Liz Pinto, Japanese labor Ideals Don't Fly, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Nov. 9, 1992, at 3;
see also Katz & MacDuffie, supra note 37, at 214 (transplant facilities are evolving into diverse
combinations of typical as well as innovative Japanese manufacturing practices). For an overview
on CAMI, see Yanarella & Green, supra note 9, at 66-70. For an overview on Mazda, see Steve
Babson, Lean or Mean: The MIT Model and Lean Production at Mazda, 18 LAB. STUD. J. 3
(Summer 1993); Christian Berggren, NUMMI vs. Uddevalla, 35 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 37, 45 n.l2
(Winter 1994) (Mazda/AutoAIIiance's and OM/Suzuki's outcome is very different than at NUMM1).
Babson quoted a AutoAIIiance human resources manager saying, Mazda had "a very unhappy
workforce." Babson, supra note. Mazda's difficulties ultimately led to Ford assuming a more
explicit joint venture role, and greater responsibility in the management of the enterprise. Yanarella
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plant firms inflexibly attempted to institute and retain the Japanese model
wholesale, with few changes tailored to fit the very different North
American social and institutional culture. This seems to have played an
important role in the failure of lean production/worker participation
models at several plants. 169
The NUrvfMI success story is not just one of transplantation of
Japanese philosophy and methods to the United States. While NUM:MI
management initially attempted to do this, over time, the corporate
culture has been Americanized, creating more breathing room for
individuality and greater acceptance of conflict than is customary in a
land where conformity is traditional. NUrvfMI has been described as "a
more humanistic variant [of the Toyota system, designed] to accommodate an older and more militant labor force." 170 Several observers have
predicted that successful transplantation of Japanese manufacturing
systems to U.S. industry would require modification of both historic U.S.
manufacturing methods, particularly work organization and labor
management relations, and modification of Japanese practices. 171
The mood in some transplant facilities was summarized by Rehder
and Finston: "Many U.S. transplant employees are asking what the point
is of duty, loyalty, quality, teamwork, and productivity if the end result
is loss of individual freedom, compromised individual due process, and
diminished quality of work life." 172 As Steve Babson noted in his
study of the Mazda plant, "the emancipative potential of lean production
is easy to invoke in the abstract, but difficult to specify in concrete
terms; [meaningful analysis depends on] detailed inspection of how
power is distributed and conflict negotiated." 173 The problem of

& Green, supra note 9, at 60 n.24; Katz & MacDuffie, supra note 37, at 215 n.5 (outlining the
changes in corporate ownership at the plant).
169. See, e.g., Young, supra note 47, at 678-79.
170. Adler & Cole, supra note 150, at 49; see also Tomer, supra note 148, at 74; Turner, supra
note 2, at 235. Adler & Cole wrote, "A good case can be made that the Japanese have been forced
to modify the harsher aspects of their production system to make them more compatible with the
expectations of Western workers." Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 88.
171. See, e.g., Young, supra note 47, at 678. For a broader description ofJapanese management
philosophies, their relationship to Japanese manufacturing techniques, and an in depth discussion of
how the differences between Mexican and Japanese cultures may affect the adoption of Japanese
manufacturing methods, see generally John J. Lawrence & Rejh-Song Yeh, The Influence ofMexican
Culture on the Use ofJapanese Manufacturing Techniques in Mexico, 34 MGMT INT'L REv., 49, 5759 (1994). For a description of the value differences between Japanese and American societies
posing obstacles to the straightforward adoption of Japanese lean production methods in the U.S.,
see Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 17.
172. Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 6.
173. Babson, supra note 168, at 3.
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consistent leadership and thorough managerial commitment to the power
sharing entailed in employee empowerment has been the stumbling block
in many efforts to institute such corporate transformations, and hardly
limited to the auto industry transplant operations. 174
Numerous American companies have attempted to "cherry pick"
features of the model, attempting to institute intensified work, reduced
buffers, and other lean production practices while generally maintaining
the command and control model of employer-employee relations and in
particular, preserving more flexibility regarding job security promises. 175 Practice among domestic auto manufacturers has been extremely
diverse at the plant level, although recent national collective bargaining
agreements between the UAW and the Big Three have provided workers
with increasing levels of income and job security. 176
Central to the success of the NUMMI version of employee
empowerment is the depth of delegation of true decision-making power.
One employee involvement consultant has categorized three options for
employers soliciting employee input into problem solving: management
can ask for input but make the final decision alone, management can ask
for the employee group's recommendation, participate in the discussion
and decisionmaking, but reserve the right to veto the decision; or
management can wholly delegate the decisionmaking to the group, by
agreeing in advance to follow the group's consensus. 177 The teams at
NUMMI have this third, final level of authority, or something very close
to it, as to most operational matters affecting the work they do day-to-.
day. As to many broader matters, management deals with both the union
and the work teams in a way approximating the middle position,
attempting to reach mutual consensus, while not committing to implementing the consensus outcome. Even as to areas of broad entrepreneurial decisionmaking, such as changes in manufacturing or product, the
union is informed early on, and its reactions sought.
Most American businesses, on the other hand, apply the "employee
involvement" label to programs which seek employee ideas and
suggestions while reserving all decisionmaking power to management
and narrowly circumscribing the sphere in which employee participation
is sought. Such programs tend to be abandoned within a few years. 178

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See, e.g., Brown, supra note 3, at 42, 45-46.
See, e.g., Katz & MacDuffie, supra note 37, at 195.
Katz & MacDuffie, supra note 37, at 203-08.
Brown, supra note 3, at 45.
See, e.g., Kelley & Harrison, supra note ISO, at 254-55, 277.
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A large part of the reason the workers and the union believe NUlV1MI
means business when it speaks of employee participation is that the
company's participation structures and processes actually share large
swaths of real decisionmaking authority with the employees in teams or
through their union, and members of management throughout the
hierarchy by and large act in conformity with the values they espouse.179 Counterfeits simply don't work, at least over extended
periods of time. 180
One should not overstate NUJ\.1Ivii's commitment to the UAW. The
company has in effect, agreed not to try to eliminate or escape from the
union, unless it closes the business completely. Yet NUMMI has used
its heavy leverage in the form of new investment and expansion of jobs
in the plant, and the reverse, the threat of disinvestment and decline, to
extract concessions on several occasions going beyond what the union
and the work force felt it could comfortably live with. Such pressurebased changes plainly fray the fabric of the NUMMI-UAW relationship.181 In addition, Toyota, the managing partner in the joint venture,
has chosen to operate all of its non-joint venture plants in North America
on a non-union basis. 182 Moreover, unionization of NUlV1MI was
acceptable to Toyota if, and only if, the union was willing to function
within the company's broadly defined parameters for the role of the
union, which required it to accept the premise that mutual advantage is
to be gained through harmonious industrial relations. 183 It appears to
be Toyota's view, like many other Japanese transplants operating in the
U.S., that reconciling independent union representation with their
179. Cf. Adler & Cole, supra note 150, at 48 (commenting that ''the highly disciplined Toyota
approach is viable from a human point of view only when associated with a management system
considerably more enlightened than that found in the average U.S. [assembly] plant.").
180. See, e.g., Kelley & Harrison, supra note 150, at 254-55, 277. Ol)e analyst has
hypothesized, "The greater an organization's emphasis on control-oriented values, the more likely
it will experience implementation failure" in efforts to gain productivity and flexibility benefits from
advanced manufacturing technologies. Zammuto & O'Connor, supra note 149, at 716.
181. Compare Voos, supra note 143, at 17 (expressing doubts about the viability of combining
hard bargaining strategies with shopfloor participation programs) with RICHARD E. WALTON ET AL.,
STRATEGIC NEGOTIATIONS x, 212, 321, 350 (1994) (contending that for corporate management
seeking transition from traditional to lean production/team based work organization systems, optimal
negotiation strategy is a combination of"forcing," i.e., confrontational hard bargaining to eliminate
traditional union protections and undermine union power, with "fostering," or bargaining
emphasizing cooperation and consensus).
182. See Yanarella & Green, supra note 9, at 57, 71; Katz & MacDuffie, supra note 37, at 185,
187, 191-92.
183. Cf. Humphrey, supra note 53, at 98. The Japanese transplant strategy often used in the
UK is to recognize a union, "but it is carefully selected for its acceptance of company goals, and its
representation is severely circumscribed by ... agreement." Humphrey, supra note 53, at 98.
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production and workforce organization methods puts a strain on their
institutions and expectations.
NUMMI should not be mistaken for more expansive models of
worker participation, such as those presented by Volvo and Satum. 184
NUMMI adheres to rather traditional norms in completely separating
labor from management regarding both the composition of its Board of
Directors and the union's or workers' role in traditional managerial
decisions such as product choice, marketing strategies, and hiring
decisions. 185 Nevertheless, NUMMI is far more open to input and
more forthcoming with advance information and consultation, than the
traditional American employer. Professors Adler and Cole have aptly
coined the phrase "democratic Taylorism" to epitomize the NUMMI
model. 186
Nor should NUMMI be mistaken for worker participation schemes
which permit workers greater freedom in the actual performance of their
tasks. 187 NUMMI permits workers much more input into the design of
the details of their jobs than would a traditionally organized automobile
manufacturing plant. Nevertheless, once the design is established in the
form of "standardized work," the employee must rigorously adhere to it,
absent safety hazard or mistake. 188 Thus, this system is distinguishable
from those where workers have reorganized the work into a more craftlike production system, or into one permitting greater individual
variation. In particular, the demands of mass, albeit somewhat customized, production may encourage a different approach in the automobile

184. For a description of labor relations and production methods at Saturn, see Katz &
MacDuffie, supra note 37, at 209-10; Yanarella & Green, supra note 9, at 60-66; Filipczak, supra
note 32, at 29-30, 32. Governance aspects of the now-closed Volvo Uddevalla plant are discussed
in Adler, supra note 4, at 90; Berggren, supra note 168, at 37, 40-41, 44; Rehder & Finston, supra
note 84, at 19-20.
185. See, e.g., Quesada Presentation, supra note 1.
186. Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 89.
187. The literature discussing the now-defunct Volvo plant at Uddevalla provides the most
extensive description of a "neo-craft'' approach to automobile manufacturing. See generally Rehder
& Finston, supra note 84, at 18-21. The developing German model falls into yet a third category.
Turner, supra note 2, at 220-32. Volkswagen has worker representation on its corporate supervisory
board where the employees have input but no formal control over matters such as product choice
and marketing strategies. Nevertheless, VW workers have works council-based input and partial codetermiqation rights regarding the institution and functioning of new teamwork experiments. Their
work is organized with longer cycle times, permitting more freedom to workers than at NUMMI,
but far less than would be the case in a ''neo-craft", Volvo-like environment.
188. See Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 86, 89; Adler & Cole, supra note 150, at 46; Berggren,
supra note 168, at 41.
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industry than might be feasible in other fields. 189
At bottom, NUMMI provides one, lawful, highly successful model
for operating a high productivity, high quality manufacturing plant with
a unionized workforce, in a participatory system. Under current U.S.
labor law, a wide range of possible models are available. Experimentation is particularly desirable in a period when manufacturing and
information processes are themselves in an extreme state of flux.

VII.

LEGAL OBSERVATIONS

One set of pertinent legal questions relate to the present lawfulness
of the NUMMI labor relations system, and whether comparable systems
are protected, prohibited, encouraged, or discouraged by existing labor
law. A second set of questions inquires whether advantages or disadvantages of this type of production and labor relations system support legal
changes to protect, prohibit, or encourage adoption of various aspects of
this model. How can we encourage broad dissemination of this model,
do we want to, and under what conditions?
To a very large extent, one must conclude, the success at NUMMI
depends upon the cooperative attitudes and personal support of both
management and the workforce, throughout all levels of the firm. Law
can mandate structures with some success, processes with less success,
corporate culture only indirectly and tenuously through the first two.
To the extent legally required or encouraged structures facilitate the
inception or maintenance of high productivity, cooperative labormanagement relationships, the goal of improving North American global
competitiveness could justify appropriate legal policy changes. However,
disadvantages in modifying the status quo, upsetting existing expectations, institutional arrangements, and the balance of power between labor
and management, demand great caution, as well as thoughtfulness and

189. Professors Adler and Cole contend that for automotive and other "labor-intensive volume
production," the NUMMI model is more efficient and appropriate than more flexible forms of
production exemplified in the Volvo Uddevalla plant. Adler & Cole, supra note 150, at 49. They
reason that because of''the high ratio of routine to non[-]routine tasks ... in auto assembly, ... the
sacrifice of efficiency and conformance [entailed in Volvo-style production is unlikely to be] worth
the gains in flexibility." Adler & Cole, supra note 150, at 48. They believe that NUMMI is the
more effective model for encouraging organizational learning because the standardized work process
greatly facilitates both incremental innovation and diffusion of the results throughout the plant. "The
NUMMI model thus assumes a higher growth rate for productivity and manufacturing quality."
Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 86. They hold open the possibility, however, that in operations
involving higher variety production, Volvo-like neo-craft models might prove superior. Adler &
Cole, supra note 4, at 46, 48.
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attention to detail in analyzing the impact on the labor relations system
as a whole of even seemingly minor modifications.
A.

Lawfulness of the NUMMI Model

In accord with most other commentators, save for a few doubts
about some minor details, I regard the system in operation at NUMMI
as lawful, neither protected nor prohibited by law in its broad design.
However, several legal issues take on quite a different appearance if one
assumes, instead of a strong, independent union such as the UAW, a
weak or unaffiliated union, or no union at all.
The key features of the NUMMI model for purposes of this
examination include team-based work organization and worker participation, union-management joint committees, round tables and other forums,
advance negotiation and pre-implementation settlement throughout midterm of the labor agreement of most operational, non-individual workeroriented issues, mixed cooperative and confrontational roles assigned to
shop floor representatives, and health and safety problems stemming
from lean production. In legal terms, three clusters of issues are raised:
(1) National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"Y 90 questions, centering on
employer domination, support, or interference with a labor organization
in violation of section 8(a)(2) 191 , as well as exclusivity of representation under section 9(a); 192 (2) duty of fair representation problems; and
(3) occupational safety and health, workers' compensation, tort and
disability-related discrimination issues. The nature of the inquiry in the
first two legal areas depends on the presence and nature of unionization
at the plant, and therefore will be examined under alternative assumptions
as to unionization, followed by consideration of safety and disability
problems.

1.

Section 8(a)(2) and Other NLRA Issues in the Union Case

When a NUMMI-like model is agreed upon between management
and a strong, independent union, one may raise technical questions of
compliance with the NLRA, but the doctrine can be shaped to accommodate NUMMI-type structures without undue strain, provided the
employer, like NUMMI, is indeed acting cooperatively with the union,

190. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
191. /d.§ 158(a)(2).
192. /d. § 159(a).
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and not simultaneously seeking to undermine it.
Each of the multiple organs of union and employee participation
structures can be questioned as involving employer dominated labor
organizations under section 8(a)(2), and invasions of the union's
exclusive representation franchise under section 9(a), hence in violation
of section 8(a)(5).
Many of these questions, however, appear more theoretical than
actual. Where the union is clearly independent of the employer's
organization, and the union and employer, in arms' length negotiations,
enter into a substantial collective bargaining agreement, one can
characterize worker participation in the various labor-management
structures as either involving representatives of the union, or as bodies
whose employee members are acting with authority delegated to them by
the union. So long as the union, rather than management, selects or
elects members to the committee, even a mutually agreed upon charter
of activities and procedures for a joint body should not vitiate the fact
that the union remains free to withdraw from the arrangement in the
future. Mutual, good faith negotiation of such arrangements should not
constitute illegal domination of or interference with the resulting "labor
organization." There can be no "mistaken belief that [an organization]
is truly representative and afford[s] an agency for collective bargaining"193 when the belief is not mistaken. 194
Alternatively, insofar as bodies such as employee teams make
decisions addressing employee "grievances" on behalf of only their own
members, they fall within the proviso to section 9(a) permitting
individual or group adjustment of grievances, provided the outcome is
not inconsistent with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
The union is either present, if these bodies are regarded as falling within
the structure of the local union as well as the company, or the union has
waived its entitlement to be present by contractually passing through to
the employee body entitlement to represent itself. 195

193. Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 1968).
194. The relaxation of any of these constraints, however, present more doubtful cases which are
addressed below.
195. See Caterpillar v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 395 (1987); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
332, 339 (1944). It may be that work teams in any event fall outside the strictures of section 8(a)(2)
on grounds that they are not "labor organizations" within the meaning of section 2(5) of the Act,
either because they are not "representative," since they reach decisions affecting only their own
group, or because in the aggregate, all bargaining unit employees participate in the teams, or because
the team decision making is autonomous. This argument shapes up somewhat differently, depending
on the details of how the teams function, and whether either the team leader is construed to be a
supervisor, or if the group leader, who clearly is supervisory, participates in the decision making.
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At bottom, contentions that the NLRA flatly prohibits NUMMI-style
labor-management cooperation with an independent union are based upon
two points: the NUMMI model eliminates the open battle, and where
successful, even the covert struggle, for control over the shop floor. 196
Simultaneously, it encourages management to buy, and workers to sell,
their mental as well as physical labor, rather than to retain the traditional
division between management and workers. 197 The contention is often
made that both of these changes are at odds with basic assumptions
embedded in the NLRA. Even assuming that the framers of the Wagner
Act premised its design upon these assumptions, and that they were not
modified in the enactment of Taft-Hartley, 198 the language and structure
of the NLRA as a whole appear flexible enough to readily absorb the
structural design of a NUMMI-type labor-management relationship.
The limit on how far a union can proceed in this direction is better
set through the broad policies shaping the duty of fair representation,
rather than through parsing the language of sections 2(5), 8(a)(2),
8(b)(l)(A), and 8(b)(2). A neat solution as to the employer might
involve construing section 8(a)(2) to define unlawful employer domination in this setting as co-terminous with employer insistence upon union
acceptance of an arrangement violative of the union's duty of fair
representation. This equates reasonably well with the injunction that the
employer not place itself "on both sides of the bargaining table." 199 In
any event, an employer bargaining demand which requires the union to
breach its duty, would violate the employer's duty to bargain in good
faith under section 8(a)(5), as a demand for agreement to an illegal
contract term.

These two arguments, together with the argument that the subjects considered in the teams fall
outside the coverage of section 2(5), taking them outside the scope of section 8(a)(2), will be
addressed in the non-union context infra.
196. See, e.g., Young, supra note 47, at 680-81, 684.
197. See, e.g., Barry Wilkinson & Nick Oliver, Power, Control, and the Kanban, 26 J. OF
MGMT. STUD. 47 (Jan. 1989).
198. This point is, of course, the subject of considerable debate. See, e.g., Mark Barenberg, The
Political Economy ofthe Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L.
REv. 1381 (1993); Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union" Prohibition:
The Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125 (1994); Karl
E. Klare, The Labor-Management Cooperation Debate: A Workplace Democracy Perspective, 23
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 39 (1988).
199. NLRB v. Mt. Clemens Metal Prods. Co., 287 F.2d 790,791 (6th Cir. 1961).
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The Union's Duty of Fair Representation

The union owes all employees in the bargaining unit it represents
a duty of fair representation. This duty requires it to avoid conduct as
to any of its members that is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad
faith." 200 The union's actions are arbitrary only if, in light of the
factual and legal circumstances at the time of the union's actions, the
union's behavior is "so far outside a 'wide range of
reasonableness' ... that it is wholly 'irrational' ...." 201 The union
must also at all times represent the interests of its members "in complete
good faith and honesty of purpose," like a fiduciary, wholly loyal to the
interests of the bargaining unit members alone.202
Three sets of fair representation issues result from the NUMJv.li
model. The first set involve claims that particular participatory structures
of the NUMJv.li model entail union breaches of the duty. The second set
parallel the first, but involve claims that the participatory structures will
greatly increase the incidence of violations, even if they don't compel
them. The third set relate to the values embodied in the NUMJv.li
system, rather than the structures.
The first category includes claims that joint union-management
committees, advance negotiation and resolution of potential disputes, and
the mixed cooperative and confrontational roles of shop floor union
representatives blur the distinction between the interests and identity of
union and employer. The contention is that the union's role is disrupted
to so great an extent as to preclude compliance by the union with its duty
of undivided loyalty and service to the interests of the bargaining unit.
The weaker version of these claims, the second category, asserts that

200. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
201. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 77 (1991), (quoting Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953)).
202. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). The exclusive bargaining agent
is to act for and not against those whom it represents. It is a principle of general
application that the exercise of a granted power to act in behalf of others involves the
assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the power in their interest and behalf, and
that such a grant of power will not be deemed to dispense with all duty toward those for
whom it is exercised unless so expressed.
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192,202 (1944); see Humphrey v. Moore, 375
U.S. 335, 342 (1964); see also O'Neill, 499 U.S. at 74. Section 501(a) of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act also imposes fiduciary obligations upon "officers, agents, shop
stewards and other representatives of a labor organization." 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988 & Supp.
1994).

v.
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each of these structural arrangements multiplies the probabilities of union
breaches of duty, and either taken separately or cumulatively, so reduces
prospects for compliance that the structures should be themselves held to
violate the duty.
As to joint committees and advance resolution of disputes, these
claims seem ill-founded. Advance negotiation of potential disputes in
place of unilateral implementation by the employer followed by a
protesting union grievance seems well within the "wide range of
reasonableness"203 afforded a union in representing employees. Plainly,
however, the union must act wholeheartedly in the interests of the
employees, and consider the employer's interests only as a means to that
end.204 However, courts and the National Labor Relations Board, when
confronting duty of fair representation claims arising in the "living
agreement'' context might do well to carefully scrutinize the union's
performance.
The third point, the mixed collaborative and confrontational roles
assigned to shop floor representatives, poses somewhat greater danger of
confusion for both members and union representatives alike. Clarification and differentiation of the settings in which shop floor representatives
play a cooperative ·as opposed to an adversarial role would greatly reduce
the legal and practical problems with this aspect of NUMMI's structural
configuration. Even better would be a division of labor eliminating the
overlap of inconsistent roles and functions. Internal union political
pressures appear to be inducing change along these lines in several local
unions in the automobile industry.
The core set of objections to the NUMMI model arise in reaction to
its unified teamwork-based philosophy. The traditional U.S. industrial
relations model relies on external, or primary controls to ensure that
workers' performance conforms to the employer's needs. External
controls include layers of supervision, rigidly structured jobs, and
detailed worksite rules. The Japanese model, on the other hand, relies
on indirect, or secondary controls, including both individual identification
with internalized loyalty to both work-team and company, and consensus
decisionmaking to ensure that having participated in reaching the
decision, employees will identify with it and feel bound by it. 205
This system also is intrinsically opposite to the traditional U.S.
system in its handling of recognition of competing interests. The U.S.

203. Huffman, 345 U.S. at 338.
204. See, e.g., id. at 338-39; Steele, 323 U.S. at 202-03.
205. See Young, supra note 47, at 684; Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 8, 17.
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system emphasizes the discrete interests of workers and their collective
representative, the union, on the one side, and management on the other,
and highlights individual and collective autonomy. It plays down the
shared interests of labor and management. The Japanese model, on the
other hand, highlights common interests of workers and company and
deemphasizes to the point of attempted obliteration, the continued
existence of disparate needs and concerns.
While the U.S. system does not require extreme adversarialness, it
is predicated on a healthy independence and arms-length dealing between
union and employer. The duty of fair representation,206 as well as
Board doctrines about disqualification of union representatives for
conflict of interest,207 and employer domination under sections 2(5) and
8(a)(2), presuppose a degree of independence of identity and action
between union and employer that coexists uneasily with teamwork
systems premised on a partnership relationship that approaches the
familial.
This dissonance in underlying culture and values manifests itself in
operational terms in two, closely-connected fears, both implicating the
union's ability to fulfill its duty of fair representation. First, cooperation
may mean greater integration of the union and employees into managerial
decisionmaking processes, a partial form of shared governance of the
enterprise. The concern is that this entails the reverse - that management will insinuate itself structurally, formally or informally, into the
union's decisionmaking processes, impairing the union's ability to
represent employees as an autonomous actor. Second, psychologically,
union and team leaders may lose their exclusive or even primary loyalty
to the rank and file when they become too closely integrated into
management's decisionmaking structures, thereby depriving employees
of the independent voice to which they are entitled.
As to the first, there is no inextricable logic intertwining union and
worker participation in enterprise governance with the reverse, managerial participation in union governance. The exclusion of workers and
unions from participation in managerial decisionmaking is a function of
the scope of bargaining under the NLRA, together with state corporate
and property law traditions.2°8 The union's exclusion is not legally
206. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330
(1953); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
207. See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1555, 1557 (1954).
208. Karl Klare made this point, in a slightly different context. Karl E. Klare, Workplace
Democracy &Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 1, 49-50
(1989).
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mandatory, but at the employer's option.
As to management intervention in internal union processes, on the
other hand, the duty of fair representation, NLRA doctrine regarding
disqualification of a union as a "labor organization" on the basis of
structural conflict of interest/09 the categorization of internal union
affairs as a permissive subject of bargaining,210 sections 8(a)(l) and (2)
of the NLRA, and the policies of internal union democracy embodied in
the Labor- Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LRMDA"),211
all militate to the contrary. Unions may participate with management in
corporate joint structures, but should be required to preserve separate,
core internal structures operating devoid of managerial presence and
participation. Assuming they do so, existing duties of fair representation
and fiduciary obligation, if complied with, are sufficient guarantee of
union independence. A structure which would formally compromise that
independence should be held to be unlawful. There remains a risk that
a weak union may succumb to cooptative, "cooperative" enticements, but
that is true even in more traditionally structured workplaces.
The more difficult problem is the question of psychological
dependence following from interdependence. The empirical evidence on
this point is mixed. The most meaningful check on managerial
cooptation of the union leadership plainly is not the duty of fair
representation or other NLRA-based legal obligations. Rather, it is the
presence of strongly democratic internal union norms and structures,
bolstered by the requirements of the L:MR.DA. In several instances
where the workers have felt that their leaders have "sold them out" or
become "too cozy with management" as part of participatory workplace
arrangements, they have voted them out of office.
The claim, however, is that the rank and file, as well as the
leadership, is subverted from accurately perceiving its legitimate interests
through ongoing participation and identification with the corporate
"team" interests. In addition, cooptation of the union may lead to
erosion of its internal democracy. Short of an absolute prohibition upon

209. The NLRB will disqualifY a union where a conflict of interest between the roles of
managerial and supervisory employees within the organization creates "an innate danger of abuse
of the collective bargaining process at the expense of the unit employees." Anchorage Community
Hosp., 225 N.L.R.B. 575 (1976); see also Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1964).
The union must come to the bargaining table "with the single minded purpose of protecting and
advancing the interests of the employees who have selected it as their bargaining agent .•••"
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 108 N.L.R.B. at 1559.
210. NLRB v. Wooster Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
211. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
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cooperative arrangements, it is hard to see how this situation can be
precluded through legal norms, as opposed to membership mobilization.
More focused research, at the level of the firm or workplace, would be
useful in assessing the degree of risk of subversion of union processes.
Most likely, for unions as for nations, "eternal vigilance is the price of
freedom."
3. The Non-Union Case
The non-union setting raises a host of legal and policy problems
regarding all forms of employee involvement, many of which have
already been exhaustively discussed elsewhere. The discussion here will
be limited to a brief examination of issues arising in non-union plants
adopting a NUNIMI-like model without a certified union on the premises.
A unionized employer could, in theory, attempt to implement a NillviMIlike system over the union's opposition. As a practical matter, organized
resistance would render the system unworkable. As a legal matter, the
employer would be subject to section 8(a)(2) allegations similar to those
in the non-union case,212 as well as to claims that the employer violated
the union's exclusivity of representation rights and, dependent on
circumstances, claims of failing to bargain over a mandatory subject
contrary to section 8(a)(5).213
Some non-union companies have applied lean production together
with team-based work organization without providing for employee
participation at the functional or strategic levels; others have created joint
worker-manager committees to provide employee input at either or both
of these higher levels. The lawfulness of the NillviMI model in a nonunion environment is uncertain, and depends upon how thoroughly the
employer adheres to elements of the mode1. 214
Electromation and its progeny set some parameters for legal analysis
of these cases.m Section 8(a)(2) proscribes employer domination or
interference with the formation or administration of a "labor organiza-

212. Compare, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993) and Vons Grocery
Co., 320 N.L.R.B. No.5 (1995) with, e.g., E1ectromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced,
35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
213. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
214. No consideration will be given to an employer who attempts to institute NUMMI-Iike
production models in order to establish his own, Japanese-style, company union. Traditional section
8(a)(2) analysis of such cases provides the appropriate resolution.
215. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 990.
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tion."216 Section 2(5), in turn, broadly defines a "labor organization"
as including "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee
representation committee or plan," provided (1) employees participate in
it, (2) it exists, at least in part, for the purpose of "dealing with
employers," and (3) those dealings concern "grievances, labor disputes,
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."217
Assuming an organization meets the section 2(5) definition, section
8(a)(2) is intended to ensure that the "organization itself [is] independent
of the employer-employee relationship"218 and is "entirely the agency
of the workers."219
Where joint committees are established at the employer's behest, to
address functional issues, it seems almost unavoidable that issues of
"grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment,
or conditions of work" will be discussed in a setting in which the
employee members of the committee "deal with" members of management.220 A pattern or practice of bilateral interaction between the
management and employee members of the joint committees will satisfy
the section 2(5) test for "dealing".221 The employer's establishment of
the structures and processes of the committees, and the employer's ability
to abolish them at will, then suffices to demonstrate employer "domina-

216. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2). 'Contributing fmancial or other support to a labor organization is
also proscribed in the statute. Id. Both the Board and courts routinely categorize minor secretarial
and telephone support as de minimis, while including paid release time from work as falling within
the proviso to section 8(a)(2), which permits employees ''to confer with [the employer] during
working hours without loss of time or pay." !d.
217. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 992.
218. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 213 (1959).
219. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 994 (quoting remarks of Senator Wagner).
220. ld. at 1004. (Member Oviatt, concurring). Employee committees that "act together with
[management for] the purpose of communicating, addressing, and solving problems in the workplace
that do not implicate the matters identified in Section 2(5)." Id. However, constant improvement
of quality and productivity, as constructed at NUMMI, entails consideration of subjects covered
under section 2(5). Compare id. at 1005 (Member Raudabaugh, concurring) (reasoning that in most
cases, quality and productivity committees have to address mandatory subjects of bargaining in the
course of problem solving) with id. at 1003-04 (Member Oviatt, concurring) (suggesting that
productivity committees do not meet to discuss mandatory subjects). See also, e.g., Reno Hilton
Resorts Corp., 319 N.L.R.B. No. 140 (1995) (even if most topics addressed by quality action teams
were lawful, section 8(a)(2) was violated by consideration of subjects contained in section 2(5) in
more than isolated instances).
221. Electromation, Inc., at 995 n.21, 997-98; E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. at
894; Stoody Co., 320 N.L.R.B. No. 1 (1995); Webcor Packaging, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. No. 142 (1995);
Electrornation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1161 {7th Cir. 1994). See also NLRB v. Cabot Carbon
Co., 360 U.S. 203, 218 (1959).
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tion" under 8(a)(2).222
The essence of the Japanese model is the claim that participation
"counts", that worker input is part of a consensus building
decisionmaking process. These committees cannot be labelled mere
"communication devices," if they are to perform properly within the
overall teamwork concept. Moreover, the committees are generally
representative but not autonomous, two other potential safe harbors. 223
The likely result is that joint committee structures coupled with Toyotalike teamwork consensus building probably violate section 8(a)(2). The
teams themselves, however, may evade claims of section 8(a)(2)
violation, depending on several factors.
The teams usually bilaterally "deal with" management. Their
"constant improvement" or kaizen activities inextricably include matters
such as job assignments and work duties, mandatory subjects of
bargaining encompassed within section 2(5). Nevertheless, their status
under section 8(a)(2) may be lawful. One important question is the
extent to which the communication between teams or team leaders and
management may fairly be characterized as "representational" in nature,
whether inclusion of all employees in the teams makes them in effect a
lawful committee of the whole, whether other structures exist providing
representation for broader aggregations of employees vis a vis management, and whether, in any event, representationality is required to
establish a violation of section 8(a)(2).224
The employer can avoid section 8(a)(2) problems in several other

222. See, e.g., Electromation, 35 F.3d at 1170. In the author's opinion, the Seventh Circuit
presented a more convincing argument than the one offered by Member Raudabaugh's concurring
opinion in Electromation. The Court of Appeals rejected Member Raudabaugh's contention that the
Taft-Hartley amendments expanded the range of employee free choice from having to decide
between rival unions or no union at all,. to a broader set of choices among participatory
representation structures. See id. at 1168-69. Where employers seek to adopt the package of
NUMMI structures and culture, however, it would seem that the unilateral employer determination
of the nature and scope of employee participation precludes an argument based on employee choice,
in any event. See, e.g., Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1995); Webcor
Packaging, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. No. 142 (1995).
223. See, e.g., General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1234 (1977); Mercy-Mem. Hosp., 231
N.L.R.B. 1108, 1121 (1977); John Ascuaga's Nuggett, 230 N.L.R.B. 275, 276 (1977).
224. Compare, e.g., Electromation Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 997 (leaving the question of
representationality unresolved) and Electrornation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d at 1158 (leaving open the
question of representationality) with Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 1007 n.13 (Member
Raudabaugh, concurring) (stating that representationality is not an essential factor); with id. at 9991003 (Member Devaney, concurring) (stating that representationality is an element to consider) and
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 n.6 (1993) (Member Oviatt, concurring) (stating
that representationality is required) and NLRB v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982)
(commenting that representationality is required).
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ways, each of which, however, could severely impair the functioning of
the NUMMI model. One method is to deprive the teams of meaningful
input, limiting them to "brainstorming".225 However, this would cut to
the quick of the NUMMI philosophy of consensus decision makin!f26
and participation in decision making by all workers to be affected.
Another choice would be for the employer to limit team discussions to
problems of "quality, efficiency, or productivity," and prohibit touching
upon matters such as job assignments, overtime, and other mandatory
subjects of bargaining.227 To do this, however, employees would have
to cease kaizen type activities, vitiating the point of the exercise. A final
alternative is for non-union employers to fully empower the work teams,
making them truly autonomous by treating their decisions as controlling,
eliminating any requirement of consultation with or approval by
management. Whether on grounds that the functions delegated to the
teams are managerial, hence permissive bargaining subjects, or on
grounds that the complete autonomy eliminates the element of "dealing
with" management, such an approach would be consistent with section
8(a)(2).228 However, few employers so enthusiastically proclaiming
their interest in employee participation have embraced a solution which
would shift power so far into the hands of ordinary workers. 229
In his concurring opinions in Electromation and DuPont, Member
Devaney articulated a test akin to full disclosure of conflict of interest,
or the negation of potential misrepresentation regarding loyalties and
duties of the committee. He would have exempted from section 2(5) on
grounds of lack of "agency," an employee committee which is ''unambiguously established to serve as agent of the Employer," rather than
"act[ing] as the agent or advocate of other employees." Member
Raudabaugh's four-part test of domination under section 8(a)(2) included

225. See, e.g., NLRB v. Peninsula Gen. Hosp. Medical Ctr., 36 F.3d I262, I27I-72 (4th Cir.
I994) (distinguishing legal brainstorming and one-way communication sessions from bilateral
"dealings" involving a pattern of proposals and responses); see also E./. duPont de Nemours & Co.,
3 I I N.L.R.B. at 894.
226. Participating in the team process, under a "rule of consensus," not only provides statutory
supervisors and managers with veto power, but it also ensures that the decision making process falls
within the scope of"dealing." See E./. duPont de Nemours & Co., 3I I N.L.R.B. at 895.
227. Vons Grocery Co., 320 N.L.R.B. No. 5 (I995).
228. See General Foods Corp., 23I N.L.R.B. I232, I233, I235 (I977); Mercy-Mem. Hosp., 23I
N.L.R.B. II08, II2I (I977); John Ascuaga's Nugget!, 230 N.L.R.B. 275, 276 (I977).
229. Recent employer efforts to rely on this line of case have ended in failure for precisely this
reason. See, e.g., Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 3I7 N.L.R.B. at I I IO (grievance committee's
"fmal authority" found insufficiently binding); Magan Medical Clinic, Inc., 3I4 N.L.R.B. I083
(I994).
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overlapping criteria, and could produce similar results in application.
Employers instituting NUMIVII-like structures, however, will
undercut the foundational culture of shared interests and mutual
representation they seek to inculcate if they disavow any role for either
joint committees or worker teams in kaizen or quality circles as acting
for employee interests and declare them to be acting on the employer's
behalf alone. Such candor would procure legal immunity at the price of
precluding attainment of the desired mental and emotional investment by
workers in the enterprise. In the end, Member Devaney acknowledged
the reality underlying his position. If you watch what the companies do,
and not what they say, "I find it difficult to conceive of a situation where
the very existence of an employee committee depends on the will of the
employer, that would not merit a finding that the employer dominated the
committee."230
There is also considerable evidence to suggest anti-union animus in
both site selection and screening of new hires for many of the tn:insplant
facilities. 231 While the NLRB and the Courts of Appeals have expressed various views of the elements of a section 8(a)(2) charge, the
presence of anti-union animus in conjunction with the institution and
maintenance of alleged employer dominated labor organizations nearly
always militates in favor of a finding of violation.232

230. E./. duPont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. at 901 (Member Devaney, concurring).
231. See, e.g., Kenney & Florida, supra note 15, at 32. The authors stated,
Transplant assemblers ... prefer to settle in rural areas, where unions are weak or
nonexistent. • . . Honda managers explain that they wanted to be able to hire workers
who had not picked up 'bad habits' in U.S. factories. . . . A top executive of another
automotive transplant says his company picked its site because the community is union
free and to avoid blacks.
Kenney & Florida, supra note 15, at 32. Other commentators have argued,
Many Japanese-owned auto firms in the United States have taken great precautions in
deciding where to locate the plants. Typically, such plants are located in right to work
or antiunion states and areas where unemployment is high. . . . [A] key recruiting
strategy is to hire workers without any union experience because union experience
hinders assimilation into the desired culture of the firm.
Young, supra note 47, at 690; see also Miller & Winter, supra note 15, at 25 ("mainly interested
in finding a hard-working, non-union work force of rural Americans to staff their assembly
lines... .''). Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc., officials have frankly acknowledged their fear that
unionization would interfere with their ''participatory" production system. "It has been my
experience that the team concept is slowed down when you have to work through a third party, and
that affects cost. ... The UAW is a political organization and very unpredictable." Marjorie A.
Sorge & Douglass T. Davidoff, Union Fears & Poor Sales, 27 WARD'S AUTO WORLD 42 (Feb.
1991 ). For a description of the failed union organizing efforts at transplant facilities, see Yanarella
& Green, supra note 9, at 70-73.
232. See, e.g., NLRB v. Newport News, Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241, 251
(1939); NLRB v. E1ectrornation, Inc., 35 F.3d 1148, 1167 (7th Cir. 1994); Electromation, 309
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In addition, the deliberate siting and hiring, to systematically avoid
unions, is a topic worthwhile for the NLRB to pursue, on its own merits,
under sections 8(a)(l) and (3), were an appropriate unfair labor practice
charge to be filed. 233 If this were an employment discrimination case,
it would be labelled a "pattern and practice" of violative activity. 234
B.

Legal Doctrine Which Encourages Or Inhibits Employer Adoption
of the NUMMI Model

The NUMMI model is neither mandated nor prohibited by law in
the unionized setting, but there are aspects of the NLRA which operate
to discourage potential imitators which warrant consideration. Three
overlapping facets of the NUMMI system are paradigmatic of flattened
hierarchy, worker participation schemes:
broad, generalized job
classifications, self-managed teams, and bundling of indirect labor
functions with production work. 235 Management guru Tom Peters
quotes NUMMI's formal guiding philosophy statement as including
among its elements, "every employee as a manager."236
The Supreme Court's expansive definitions of managerial and
supervisory status operate to discourage unions from entering into
agreements calling for broad assumption of participatory responsibilities.
The rewriting of workers' job descriptions to push power downward in
the hierarchy, risks transforming unionized employees into "nonemployees," i.e., managers or supervisors, with unprotected status and no
right to unionize under the NLRA.237 Consider, for example, the
N.L.R.B. 990, ·996-97 (1992) (proof of anti-union animus not required). But see id. at 1013
(Member Raudabaugh, concurring) (arguing that anti-union animus is a factor).
233. See David A. Tykulsker, For a Refonned Labor Law To Limit Plant Closings, 12 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 205 (1981).
234. See generally Marley S. Weiss, Risky Business: Age and Race Discrimination in Capital
Redeployment Decisions, 48 Mo. L. REv. 901 (1989).
235. See, e.g., Nowlin, supra note 68, at 7.
236. TOM PETERS, THRIVING ON CHAOS: HANDBOOK FOR A MANAGEMENT REVOLUTION 341
(1988).
237. See NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994) (excluding L.P.N.'s
from bargaining unit, on grounds of supervisory status); NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 67273 (1980) (holding that university faculty members possess managerial status, hence are excluded
from inclusion in the bargaining unit); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267,274-77 (1974)
(same as to buyers' agents). But see, e.g., Anamag, 284 N.L.R.B. 621 (1987) (finding that
autonomous work teams operating within a lean production/worker participation production system
were neither supervisory nor managerial, despite team collective exercise of supervisory functions
such as discipline, job and overtime assignments and performance appraisal). In Health Care
Retirement Corp., the Court used a textually-based statutory interpretation of section 2(11) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11), to strike down the NLRB's longstanding distinction between
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description of the team leaders' job at USX's Gary, Indiana facility.
This position "effectively assigns supervisory responsibility and authority
in all areas except discipline to a production or maintenance worker."238 For workers excluded from the NLRA definition of "employee," continued representation by the union is permissible, but should the
cooperative relationship turn adversarial, the employer would have the
distinct advantage of a defensible legal position in refusing to recognize
the union as the bargaining agent for non-statutory employees.239 The
self-determination, separate bargaining unit entitlement of professional
employees240 also becomes problematic when heretofore "professional"
work is integrated into production worker job descriptions.
The three year contract bar rule,241 similarly, operates to discourage all but the most self-confident unions from entering into long-term
cooperation agreements, which frequently exceed three years/42 thereby
opening the union up to the risk of decertification or a rival union
challenge during the additional term of the agreement. The mandatorypermissive bargaining subject distinction243 provides further
disincentive for unions to enter such agreements, while psychologically
dissuading employers. The union which includes promises on such

managerial type duties that are "incidental to" or "in addition to" workers' jobs and duties of those
"supervisory" workers whose major responsibilities involve the directing of others. Health Care &
Retirement Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 1782-83. The Court was forced to consider a longstanding problemthat Congress clearly intended professionals to be protected by the NLRA while excluding supervisors from coverage as employees. As Justice Ginsberg pointed out in dissent, the Court's decision
is likely to substantially reduce the number of professionals who are covered by the Act. Id. at
1791-92 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). A broad reading of the Health Care Retirement Corp. decision
could support the exclusion from employee status and union representation of all employees who
acquire any managerial-type skills or exercise independent judgment or discretion through teambased practices.
238. Jeffrey B. Arthur, The Transformation of Industrial Relations in the American Steel
Industry, in CONTEMPORARY COLLECf!VE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 529, 534 (Paula B.
Voos ed., 1994).
239. Many employers have already implemented job redefinition strategies to include a sufficient
number of supervisory or managerial tasks in rank and file workers' jobs to label them non-union
bargaining units as a union-avoidance or minimization device. See Voos, supra note 143, at 12;
Jeffrey Keefe & Karen Boroff, Telecommunications Labor-Management Relations after Divestiture,
in CONTEMPORARY COLLECf!VE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 303, 331 (Paula B. Voos ed.,
1994) (CWA suffering bargaining unit erosion via creeping transformation of unit job titles at the
upper boundary into managerial and supervisory positions).
240. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b); see generally Globe Machine & Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (1937).
241. See American Seating Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 250, 254 (1953).
242. Cf. Cutcher-Gershenfeld & McHugh, supra note 90, at 248 (discussing reasons for unions
to enter into a longer-term contract with auto parts suppliers in a cooperative labor-management
relationship).
243. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958).
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matters in a collective bargaining agreement may find only arbitral
remedies, rather than an NLRB bad faith bargaining charge possible,
should the employer have a change of heart. 244 The employer, on the
other hand, is encouraged to breach such promises, and also is psychologically dissuaded from entering into such commitments in the :first
place, since the legal regime has so sharply defined certain territory as
within the employer's prerogatives. Each of these doctrines warrants
reexamination, legislatively if necessary, if government seriously wants
to foster dissemination of NUMMI-like production and wor* processes
by mutual agreement between employers and labor unions.
Given the importance of sharing information to successful implementation of labor-management partnerships, expanding the types of
information to which the union is mandatorily entitled under the NLRA,
either by NLRB re-interpretation of the Act or by amendment is likewise
worth considering.
C. Health, Safety, Disability and Privacy Problems
The lean production method raises grave doubts about its adaptability to accommodate workers with disabilities, particularly if job rotation
is mandatory. Lean production also raises questions about the feasibility
of externally regulating job health and safety under conditions of
constantly improving and changing work practices. The sharpest
criticisms ofNUMMI and similar models of lean production and worker
participation related to the impact on employees' health and safety of
prolonged periods of work at the verge of maximum effort exertion under
the stress of internalized demands for near perfection in quantity and
quality of work.
Given the faster pace and intensified nature of the work, job safety
problems are extremely worrisome. High incidence of repetitive motion
injury has been reported at the Mazda, Nissan, and Suburu-Isuzu
transplant operations/45 as well as at Japanese automobile plants in
Japan,246 although the NUMMI-style, frequent job rotation approach
works as at least a partial prophylactic measure against such problems.
Adverse long term consequences of intensified work practices are
particularly difficult to predict and protect against at this stage.

244. See Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157,
164-65 (1971).
245. Kenney & Florida, supra note 15, at 31.
246. See Young, supra note 47, at 686.
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Job rotation thus poses an internally contradictory set of policy
problems. Workers need to rotate to minimize risk of future injury, but
those already partially disabled often find mandatory rotation an obstacle
to employment. For them, reasonable accommodation requires limited
or no rotation. In a team-based work environment, these two needs are
difficult to reconcile.
Several factors contribute to workers in many lean production plants
working at or beyond a healthily sustainable pace. First, and most
important, is the sheer speed of the production process, at NUM:MI
collectively determined by the work teams through the standardized work
process, and then programmed into the kanban cards which control the
automated aspects of the system, as well as instructing workers on the
timing they must observe. Many Japanese-owned companies operating
in the U.S., for example, have increased the work pace far beyond that
customary in U.S. manufacturing facilities. 247 This is simply the flip
side of their famed increased productivity.
To the extent that pace is at the heart of the problem, one might
think it could be decoupled from the rest of the system248 by some
form of external norm setting. Standards in theory could be enforceable
by OSHA or state counterpart regulatory agencies, or by internal norms,
set either through labor-management relations or by benevolent management, honestly invested in the long-term well-being of employees, as
well as in minimizing workers' compensation and other fringe benefit
costs.
However, in worker team-controlled systems, either management
pressures or shared commitment of workers may lead to such enthusiastic
worker "buy-in" to company goals that they themselves set standards too
high. Some commentators view team-based lean production as the
vehicle par excellence for organizational learning, productivity growth
and quality improvement in high volume, relatively standardized
production.249 Even enthusiasts concede, however, that the model may
be difficult to sustain without dehumanizing workers, absent vigorous,
democratic, independent union representation. 250 Harsher critics say
that the teams constitute a "highly threatening form of social manipulation and intimidation,"251 and contend that the price of productivity
247. See, e.g., Young, supra note 47, at 686-88.
248. See, e.g., Young, supra note 47, at 688 (arguing that ''the JIT [just-in-time] system becomes
confounded with the pace-of-work issue.").
249. See, e.g., Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 85.
250. See, e.g., Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 86.
251. Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 8.
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improvements is an inhuman workpace that results in high injury and
high turnover rates.252
On the other hand, some observers have attributed high levels of
stress to the just-in-time system, independent of the overall pace of the
work. The low levels of inventory are contended to require workers to
perform their subassembly work perfectly and on time, every time, an
internalized standard reinforced by their own team's and subsequent
teams' dependence upon them. This is said continuously to cause a
small crisis in workers' minds, improving their concentration and work
discipline, hence productivity, but without prospect of any slack or relief
except during formal break-times; it likewise maximizes their stress.253
Only scrapping or outlawing just-in-time assembly could fully obviate
this problem, and given the just-in-time process' link to higher productivity and profitability levels, this possibility is extremely remote.
A related factor exacerbates the problem. At NUM:MI and most
lean production, teamwork-based facilities, no relief workers are
available, apart from the team leader. Together with the speed of the
line, this factor has resulted in the average auto transplant factory worker
working over fifty-six minutes per hour, compared to thirty-four to forty
at General Motors.254 Together with strict absenteeism rules, this
induces greatly improved attendance and productivity, but at a steep price
to the workers' emotional life and sometimes to their health and family
commitments. Nonetheless, it is difficult to envision the appropriate
form for an externally set health and safety regulation; this seems to be
a classic workplace problem where localized norm-setting between union
and employer makes the most sense.
At its best, teamwork implies a benevolent, mutual gain-sharing type
of win-win investment by management in labor and vice versa. The
NUM:MI model in many respects seems to come close to matching its
ideals. Internalized control, peer pressure, and broader social control
function in this model as superior, and far more flexible methods of
motivation than watchdog, drive-type supervision in command and
control models. The line between such supportive benevolence and
police state tactics, however, can be very thin. Certain automotive
transplant companies have allegedly enforced their expectations that
workers remain selflessly devoted to their employer and refrain from
criticizing it, through methods of intimidation, surveillance, and

252. Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 8; Katz & MacDuffie, supra note 37, at 195.
253. See Young, supra note 47, at 685-86.
254. Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 8.
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disciplinary reprisal.255 External regulation here, too, appears to have
proven ineffective.
D.

Broader Legal Policy Questions

NUMMI, as well as many other companies, but particularly
Japanese transplants, have moved toward "boundaryless" relations with
their suppliers.256 This raises two, separate issues. First, the existing
sharp demarcation between employer-employee relations and worker
issues involving independent contractors should be reexamined. The
distinction will increasingly fail to accurately portray reality, and the
arbitrary ending of legal responsibility at the corporate boundary will
prove destructive of worker workplace rights of all types.
Second, the idea of job security is widely accepted as integral to
successful worker participation systems of all types,257 for reasons aptly
illustrated by Martha Quesada's presentation at LaJolla. Integral to job
security promises of original equipment manufacturers such as NUMMI,
is their reliance upon suppliers and contractors and temporary and
contingent workers to serve as the reserve labor pool buffer, making it
possible to fulfill the company's job security commitments.258
This strongly suggests that it is fallacious to believe our countries
can move down the road toward high productivity, secure employment
relationships for everyone. Rather, such a strategy is one of deliberately
creating two, three or even four tiers within the workforce, much as
exists in Japan.259 In such a pyramid system, only workers employed
in the top tier businesses are reasonably secure in continuous employment. In light of the history of the lower tiers in such stratified systems
being disproportionately. occupied by minorities and women, this is of
particular concern.
Moreover, if job security is a prerequisite to meaningful worker
participation schemes, absent imposition of either job security or worker
participation obligations by law, it is predictable that the great majority
of employees will be working without benefit of either, since they will
be outside the "primary'' employment sphere. Overall labor policy, then,
should not be predicated on the mirage that either labor-management

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Kenney & Florida, supra note 15, at 31-32.
See Katz & MacDuffie, supra note 37, at 192.
See, e.g., Young, supra note 47, at 685.
See, e.g., Cutcher-Gershenfeld & McHugh, supra note 90, at 252-53.
See Cutcher-Gershenfeld & McHugh, supra note 90, at 252-53.
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cooperation or job security will become the dominant approach to labormanagement relations in the manufacturing sector, absent much broader
changes in U.S. labor law.
Alternatively, one could suggest legally mandating far stronger job
security measures than presently exist, including both protections against
employment termination without just cause, and limitations on mass
layoffs and reductions in force. Apart from broader considerations of
labor policy and equity, such increased worker protections could be
justified on grounds that their mandatory existence will increase the
probability of adoption and the likely success rate of high productivity,
team work-based work organization systems.260 In addition, by eliminating the possibility of competing on the basis of more traditional,
worker coercion/fear of discharge premises, legally mandating job
security would further encourage adoption of teamwork and cooperationoriented processes.
If employee job security is the quid pro quo for meaningful
employee participation, union job security is probably the quid pro quo
for cooperative labor-management relations. "Win-win" bargaining
plainly requires mutual trust, and the absence of concern that the other
side is attempting to eliminate or undermine its bargaining partner.
In addition, studies suggest that the key factors maximizing success
in worker participation programs are themselves heavily correlated with
union representation. Programs in organized workplaces "tend to be
more and extensive than nonunion efforts, to result in more productivity
improvement and to last longer."261 NLRA changes which would
increase the security of the union's status as the exclusive bargaining
agent, increase the ease of gaining recognition, and close the many legal
and illegal vehicles for deunionization and union avoidance, would thus
increase the prospects for voluntary adoption of more cooperative, highly
productive forms of labor relations.
At bottom, the less bureaucratized, less legalized, less rule bound
system so productive at NUMMI depends upon mutual trust in the longterm relationship to produce shared interpretation of contract language;

260. Some commentators have listed four criteria which they argue increase significantly the
probability that a worker participation program will produce higher productivity. Two of the criteria
are protection against unjust dismissal and long-term employment guarantees. David I. Levine &
Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Participation, Productivity, & the Firm's Environment, in PAYING FOR
PRODUCTIVITY: A LOoK AT THE EVIDENCE (Alan L. Blinder ed., 1990), discussed in Mishel &
Voos, Unions and American Economic Competitiveness, in Unions and Economic Competitiveness
1, 10 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds., 1992).
261. Voos, supra note 143, at 6; accord Marshall, supra note 3, at 299-300.
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no legislation in the world can assure this. Nor, as sometimes suggested,
would decreased legal regulation contribute to this; rather, it would
decrease the overall level of trust if frequent breaches of mutual
understandings led to the undermining of any mutual trust. Repeal or
amendment of section 8(a)(2) to permit employers to institute the
functional equivalent of a student council would be ill-advised on
practical, economic grounds as well as on the basis of worker interests
in a modicum of dignity and democratic representation in the workplace.
Moreover, in many industries and job classifications, more traditional
forms of work organization may well prove to be the most productive.
Reconstructing federal labor relations policy on the fallacious assumption
that team-based work organization should or will be the norm across-theboard might well prove to be a serious mistake, disadvantaging the U.S.
in the globally competitive marketplace.
In addition to legal changes, broader macro-economic policy
changes could promote the development of high performance workplaces.
Both labor law and economic policy should be used to minimize the
availability and attractiveness of competition based on low wage, low
direct labor cost, deunionization strategies, to encourage investment in
human capital, and competition based on high wages and high productivity_262
Finally, whether or not section 8(a)(2) prohibits most forms of true
worker participation absent union representation, this writer would urge,
legislatively if necessary, an absolute prohibition on implementation of
lean production methods in non-union environments. The level of risk
to worker health and safety, mental and physical, short and long term, in
such high productivity environments, the impossibility of adequate
governmental monitoring in an environment of constant improvement,
hence constant change in the details of the production process, and the
extreme pressure generated by the carrots of peer pressure and company
loyalty, together with the sticks of fear of job loss, plant closure, or
subcontracting of operations, is simply too great to counter with any sort
of internal plant organization. Only an independent, trade union, whose
existence is free of dependence on the employer, can adequately police
these worker interests, even at the most minimal level.

262. Voos, supra note 143, at 15, 18-19; Marshall, supra note 3, at 305-06.
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